Bailout Cost: $8.5 Trillion so far ... and Counting

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

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One analysis has calculated that so far the bailout efforts of the U.S. government are up to $8.5 trillion. This is almost as much as the U.S. National Debt was when the bailout efforts began. So basically in a year the U.S. government has managed to double a debt level than took well over 200 years to accumulate. Don't expect to see all of these bailout costs included in the official National Debt figures however since the U.S. government engages in more off-balance sheet accounting than Enron ever dreamed of.

While these figures would seem alarming to even a casual observer, many mainstream economists don't find them troubling. Recent Nobel winner Paul Krugman claims the U.S. National Debt could be twice GDP (which would be around $28 trillion if you believe the official overstated GDP figures). How this could be a sustainable debt load for the U.S is hard to fathom, especially since we have a huge stream of social security and medicaid payments coming due in the next couple of decades because of retiring Baby Boomers (there is no money in either of these trust funds by the way, all the funds are used to support current government spending the moment they are received). Economists are also not worrying because over 50% of the bailout costs so far have been structured in the form of a loan. Much of those loans are backed by the truly worthless assets though - apparently the hope that sub-prime borrowers (this time companies) will by some magic pay back their loans still lives on and on in the fantasy land of modern economic belief. While up to now over 95% of bailout costs have been in the form of corporate welfare, expect this to change starting next year with a shift toward more support for individuals.

Although the inflation implications of U.S. government bailout profligacy should be ratcheting government bond yields to record levels, this has not happened yet. A flight to safety among desperate investors had kept U.S. bond yields unusually low (corporate bond yields are at a record spread to treasuries however). The drop in yields combined with the plunge in U.S. stocks has actually caused S&P 500 yields to be greater than 10-year U.S. Treasuries for the first time since 1958. Before that date this relationship was the norm. Don't assume that norm is returning however as some pundits are claiming. Stock yields are being kept artificially high by the bailout programs, which have allowed some companies to fund their dividends with U.S. taxpayer money. Stock dividends are going to come down and U.S. bond yields will eventually go up when they adjust to the inflationary realities of government spending.

Meanwhile, the bailout programs are not nearly at an end yet. As we have said in the New York Investing meetup since the credit crisis began, there is no such thing as one bailout for an insolvent financial firm. No firm has been better than Citigroup in proving this point. After five private bailouts earlier in the year, Citi got $25 billion from TARP and only weeks later had to have a much bigger government cash infusion to stay afloat. The auto makers are in Washington hat in hand at the moment with a low entry level bailout request - expect those costs to keep going up next year as well. And of course, their are more bailouts waiting in the wings.

NEXT: Economic Predictions for 2009

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

This posting is editorial opinion. Like all other postings for this blog, there is no intention to endorse the purchase or sale of any security.

What Banks and Enron Had in Common

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

The Subprime Crisis began to take a serious toll on bank and broker earnings by the third quarter of 2007. Merrill Lynch led the pack with a $8.4 billion dollar write down. Citibank reduced its earnings by $5.9 billion, UBS by $3.4 billion, and JP Morgan by $3.1 billion. Deutsche Banks had $3.1 billion in write downs, but still amazingly managed to post a rise in earnings (one wonders who did their accounting). There was of course a lot of chatter from the talking heads in the media about whether or not these write downs were the final word in the impact of the Subprime Crisis on financial company earnings. Even the most casual knowledge of stock market history would have provided the answer - 'no they were not!' Whenever earnings in a group of stocks start to fall apart, the first write downs are never the last and usually aren't even the biggest for that matter. This was the pattern when the tech bubble burst only a few years earlier and yet many media commentators couldn't seem to remember even that far back.
Even without a knowledge of history, there was more than enough evidence to indicate that financial company write offs might get much bigger and go on for a long time. SIVs - structured investment vehicles - had already hit the news many weeks before November of 2007. These off-balance sheet items (think Enron) were so obscure that most people on Wall Street had never heard of them. Suddenly, there were an extra $400 billion of possibly bad debt that was not on the balance sheet of the banks, but would be winding up there eventually. Citibank alone had $100 billion in credit exposure to SIVs. This new wrinkle in the Subprime Crisis was viewed as so serious by the U.S. Treasury Secretary that he attempted to organize a bailout (how he had the authority to do so is unclear) by getting a number of large banks and brokers to create a pool that could buy up SIV assets and thereby support their prices. While much ballyhooed by the press, this effort went nowhere and was eventually abandoned by December.

While the Treasury Department's plans for SIVs fell through, the Federal Reserve created an alternative that could help out the big banks. It allowed them to borrow against their (highly questionable) assets, but this necessitated bringing the assets onto the books. In December, Citibank indeed brought $49 billion in SIV assets onto it balance sheet. It is presumed that the other $51 billion the Citi had originally in SIVs had disappeared because of reductions in value. Indeed, it was reported in December that the total value of SIVs was then only $298 billion (it was quite possible that even this was a significant overstatement of their actual worth). If Citi had lost approximate $50 billion in its SIV investments, it was not fully (if at all) reflected in write offs in its first quarter 2008 earnings report.

Although SIVs were considered a serious threat to the stability of the banking system, little did the public know in the fall of 2007, that they were not the sum total of all off-balance sheet items that the banks were holding. After all, why would a company have off-balance sheet items unless it wanted to hide what it was really doing? Since there purpose is secrecy, how does anyone know how many off-balance sheet items a company has, what assets they contain, and how much those assets are really worth? While it would be reasonable to assume that if there was one type of off-balance sheet item on a companies books, there could easily be others, there was little if any speculation on this matter by the financial media. Only in February of 2008 was it reported that SIVs were actually only one type of off-balance sheet items held by the banks - and the possible losses were much greater than had been previously imagined. The accountants who did Enron's book must have been envious.

Next: Mortgage Insurer Meltdown.

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup

For more information about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21.