Showing posts with label insolvent. Show all posts
Showing posts with label insolvent. Show all posts

Monday, April 14, 2008

The Fed's (long) Term Auction Facility


The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

On November 28, 2007 the Federal Reserve started a massive year end injection of liquidity into the financial system. On December 11th, the Fed once again lowered the funds rate a quarter of a point (for a total of 100 basis point drop since the half point cut on September 18th). While neither of these events were extraordinary, what happened the next day was.

On December 12th, the Fed announced the creation of its Term Auction Facility . The TAF program was open to any bank or depository institution, which would be allowed to bid for one-month loans up to the total amount of funds being auctioned off. The winners had a wide-choice of what they could pledge as collateral, including mortgage-backed securities that could not be traded and had no market price. In exchange for their possibly worthless securities, banks and brokers could get cash from the Fed. This new program represented a sea change in Fed operations.

First, the Fed would be offering up sums of money in auctions to banks and depository institutions instead of having them come to the Fed to get a loan. Using the Fed's discount window was usually only done by institutions teetering on insolvency and was carefully avoided by any institution that wanted to preserve its reputation. The Fed finally found a way around this impediment to getting money to struggling banks by offering the money at auction, guaranteeing an injection of liquidity into the system at the amount auctioned off and removing the stigma for those who got the money.

The second major change the TAF introduced was that the Fed was willing to take even worthless paper as collateral for a loan. During its history the Fed usually only accepted treasuries as collateral. With the TAF, it effectively began engaging in subprime lending itself . By doing so, it was bailing out the banks that had foolishly engaged in this practice - and who might have become insolvent if they couldn't get rid of their subprime paper.

When the TAF was announced in December, the original auctions were for $20 billion each. By January 2008, this amount was raised to $30 billion. By March each auction was for $50 billion and two additional Fed lending facilities would be introduced (the TSAF and the PDCF) - breaking even newer ground for Fed operations.

Next: Economic Predictions for 2008

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup

For more about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21

Wednesday, April 9, 2008

Subprime Freezes Over


The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.


In December of 2007, the Bush administration proposed freezing the rates on adjustable subprime mortgages for 5 years. This program was 'voluntary'. Indeed the U.S. government had no legal authority to void valid contractual commercial transactions between parties, one of the most fundamental underpinnings of our economy. Nevertheless, presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and John Edwards both immediately criticized the proposal as not doing enough and advocated an even longer freeze on rates.

While the alleged purpose of this program was to help the 'struggling homeowner', an examination of the details indicated otherwise. Homeowners with fixed-rate mortgages got no relief. Homeowners with non-subprime variable-rate mortgages got no relief. Why were just sub-prime adjustable-rate mortgage holders singled out? The answer is simple, these mortgages were defaulting and would be defaulting at the highest rates. Many of these had been granted at the end of the mortgage boom and were for a substantial percentage of the house price at the time of sale (up to and even exceeding 100%). Mortgages for 100% of equity, especially when housing prices are falling, are the last thing banks want to take back and have to write off on their books. These are guaranteed losses for the bank since the foreclosed house would likely sell for much less than the amount of the mortgage. Any bank that had a large number of this type of defaulted mortgages could become technically insolvent fairly quickly. Mortgage bond holders, many of them big banks and brokers, who had bought bonds containing these loans would also lose out. It is a much better deal for banks to foreclose on mortgages that have been substantially paid down, since they make a big profit on these. These homeowners were the most deserving and required the least assistance, so they should have been the centerpiece of any mortgage relief program - but they weren't. Helping them would mean hurting bank profits.

The proposed freezing of sub-prime mortgage rates also represented the first attempt at price controls on the part of the government. Price controls are an almost universal response to inflation by the authorities and prices for necessities are the most likely to be controlled. While the rise in mortgage payments was preplanned and the exact amounts were known in advance (rarely the case with most inflation,) this was no different from any other attempts to dampen rising prices by freezing them. it was not surprising that this took place first in housing either since it is one of the most basic of necessities. Unfortunately, price controls always have negative consequences. In the case of the mortgage freeze, anyone offering loans in the future would have to demand higher rates to compensate for the possibility that rates might be frozen. Or lenders seeing higher risk in the market would simply not offer loans at all. In both these scenarios future mortgage rates will be higher than they would have been. The government could then solve this problem that it created by offering subsidies (a common second response to increased prices for necessities), most likely through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These government supported enterprises would then wind up dominating the mortgage market so much that it would effectively be completely socialized. By the end of 2007, it looked like this was already taking place.


NEXT: The Fed's (long) Term Auction Facility


Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup


For more about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21








Thursday, April 3, 2008

Sovereign Wealth Funds Bail Out the Banks


The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.


As the credit crisis unfolded in the fall of 2007, a number of big banks and brokerage houses were desperate for capital - far more desperate than was ever admitted publicly. While they needed large cash infusions to continue operating, a number of sovereign wealth funds in the oil-rich Gulf and the Far East had swollen coffers of dollars that they needed to place somewhere. It was therefore almost inevitable that some of the first bailouts (an insolvent financial institution requires multiple bailouts) of struggling financial institutions would be done by sovereign wealth fund purchases. By the end of 2007, it was estimated that these funds would make at least $37 billion of investments in Western financial companies.

The idea of foreign investment as a means of providing capital was not a completely new one. Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal of Saudi Arabia had purchased 5% of Citibank (then Citigroup) when it was reeling from the Savings and Loan Crisis in the early 1990s. Earlier in 2007, China purchased a $3 billion stake in Blackstone's IPO, which debuted just before the collapse of the private equity bubble and promptly plummeted in price. By November, Abu Dhabi had bought a 4.9% stake in Citibank for $7.5 billion. At the time of the purchase, rumors were circulating on Wall Street that Citi might be insolvent. U.S. government officials admitted being involved in the transaction, which begs the question as to whether or not they would have allowed the deal to go through if it wasn't absolutely necessary for Citibank's survival.

In early December, the Government of Singapore Investment corporation got 9% ownership in UBS for a little less than $10 billion and an unnamed middle eastern investor (thought to be Oman) bought a 2% stake. China then bought a 9.9% stake in Morgan Stanley only days before Christmas. Singapore's Temasek Holdings then helped bail out Merrill Lynch on December 24th. By mid-January, Citibank was already in need of a second bailout by the sovereign wealth funds, only two months after the first one had taken place. The Government of Singapore, the Kuwait Investment Authority and Price Alwaleed were part of a $12.5 billion capital infusion for which they got some ownership of the bank in return. On the same day, only weeks after its first cash infusion from a sovereign wealth fund, Merrill Lynch received an additional $6.6 billion from parties including the Kuwait Investment Authority and the Korean Investment Corp.

None of these deals had to undergo scrutiny by the U.S. Committee on Foreign Investment, which only examines whether acquisitions by overseas buyers compromise national security when their stakes rise above 10%. Given the large number of sovereign wealth funds and wealthy individuals in the Gulf States and Far East, it would be possible for their aggregate ownership to reach 100% without a review ever taking place.
Next: Government Investment Pools Dry Up

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
For more about the New York Investing meetup, please go to our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21