As U.S. Banks Deteriorate, Obama Proposes New Regulation

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. We have coined this term to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government, which involve unprecedented money printing. This is the official blog of the New York Investing meetup.


President Obama proposed placing new limits on the size and activities of big U.S. banks on January 21st. The new plan, known as the Volcker Rule, would effectively prevent banks from owning hedge funds and private equity funds and seeks to place curbs on the market share of liabilities for any given firm. It follows last weeks proposed new tax on the big banks to recoup losses from the 2008 bailout. The administration apparently hadn't informed Wall Street about the impending news. The U.S. market was caught off guard and predictably sold off sharply with the banks leading the way. The European and Asian markets sold off in sympathy.

Recent earnings on the big banks have shown that their loan portfolios are continuing to deteriorate. Fourth quarter regional bank earnings confirm that little if any improvement has taken place since the depths of the Credit Crisis. BB&T (BBT) earnings fell 36% last quarter and its provision for credit losses were $725 million versus $197 million in the fourth quarter of 2008. Huntington Bancshares (HBAN) losses on its commercial real estate portfolio were $258 million in the fourth quarter versus $169 million in the third quarter. SunTrust (STI) non-accrued loans are now $5.40 billion, down $42 million from the previous quarter, still very high and barely getting better.

While it is possible something may eventually come from the Obama proposals, investors shouldn't expect that they are a done deal.  In his signature, it's not my job approach, the president appeared to be leaving crucial details for his bank oversight plan to be hashed out by Congress - an institution that is perennially dysfunctional and which is viewed almost universally unfavorably by the American electorate (one recent poll found that only 21% of voters view congress favorably). This is how Obama handled his intended health care reform, which has turned into a giant boondoggle for the administration. Obama has also taken this tack with his proposed consumer protection agency that has gotten caught in partisan wrangling on the Hill. If Obama's intention is to just talk about something, but make sure nothing ever happens, he seems to have found the magic formula.

Obama took office right after the lowest point of the Credit Crisis. Like any new president, he had enormous political capital at that moment, but did very little with it. He was president for a year before he said in his press conference proposing new bank regulation that the banks nearly wrecked the economy by taking "huge, reckless risks in pursuit of quick profits and massive bonuses."  Unfortunately, we are still suffering from the after-effects of the Credit Crisis and this will be the case for some years to come. Mortgage defaults are still a major problem for the banks and a burgeoning commercial loan crisis is now taking place. In 2009, 140 U.S. banks went under, the largest number since the Savings & Loan Crisis. The administration's efforts to handle banking problems so far have been ineffective at best. It would be preferable if the Obama administration solved the current serious problems first rather than concentrating on some distant future situation.

Disclosure: None

NEXT: The Case Against Reappointing Ben Bernanke

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer,New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

This posting is editorial opinion. Like all other postings for this blog, there is no intention to endorse the purchase or sale of any security.

A Recovery Reminscent of 1990s Japan

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

Our Video Related to this Blog:

Economists are predicting that the U.S. recession is over or will be soon. A Wall Street Journal survey found that 57% of economists think the recession is already over. Another 23% think it will end this month or next. Their predictions for GDP growth in the third quarter are currently around 3% and range as high as 6%. Nevertheless economists are not predicting that the employment picture will be improving anytime soon or that incomes will rise. They make it clear that the recovery means "things are less bad than they were previously" and "this is definitely a recovery that only a statistician can love". Statistics are indeed one of the few things that will be manufactured while the blossoming 'recovery' takes place.

The big areas of the economy are still not doing well, even in the statistics. Retail sales surprised economists yesterday when they fell 0.1% in July. Economists had predicted they would rise 0.7%. The key to the 'improvement' was the government's cash for clunkers program which is revving up the auto industry (you should ask yourself, what is going to happen to the auto industry when this program stops?). Indeed it did, but not enough to turn retail sales positive. Excluding autos, retail sales were down 0.6%. General merchandise sales were down 0.8% and department store sales down 1.6%. Yeah, consumers are spending again all right. Consumer spending is 70% of the U.S. economy.

CPI was out this morning and prices were supposedly down 2.1% year over year. Responsible for most, if not all of the drop, were energy prices which were down more than 28%. Oil peaked last July at $147 a barrel, then dropped sharply until hitting $33 a barrel in December. Going forward the current oil price compared to last years is going to turn from a huge drop into possibly a big gain. Expect CPI figures to start rising in the fall as a result.

The industrial production figures are out later this morning and after dropping 17 months in a row are expected to be up. While this is hardly surprising, expect the press to claim it indicates recovery. This is like saying a stock that dropped 17 days in a row and then goes up on the 18th day is rallying.

New numbers were released this morning on the real estate market. At the end of the second quarter, 32.2% of all U.S. mortgaged properties were under water. This unbelievable huge number was actually down slightly from the 32.5% at the end of the first quarter. The real estate industry declared that this was "great news". While all of these mortgages are potential future foreclosures, it is currently predicted that the U.S. foreclosure rate will peak at only 4%. If the U.S. government pays off the mortgages for the other 28%, and I wouldn't put it past them, this could happen.

Essentially any good GDP numbers will be the result of government injections into the economy. This is like a company that borrows a million dollars including the million dollars as part of its earnings. Government boosting of GDP on borrowed or printed money should not be included in the figures (don't assume that reform is ever going to be made). In these circumstances, when the programs that boosted the economy end, GDP falls right back down. This is exactly what happened in Japan in the 1990s and early 2000s. The economy stayed in the doldrums for two decades.

NEXT: Japan Climbs Out of Recession ... Again

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer,New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21


This posting is editorial opinion. Like all other postings for this blog, there is no intention to endorse the purchase or sale of any security.

Run on the Bank 2008 - Indymac

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

Our video for this posting can be found at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NqBhR1kkWHY.

Indymac was a large savings and loan that had split off from Countrywide, the largest mortgage provider in the United States, in 1997. Both were heavily involved in granting mortgages in the real estate bubble markets of the southwestern United States. Countrywide itself experienced a run on the bank in August 2007 in the earliest phase of the subprime crisis. Only an emergency cash infusion from Bank America, arranged by the Federal Reserve, kept it afloat. This was only a stopgap measure however and Bank America agreed to take over Countrywide in early 2008. This deal was also apparently secretly arranged by the Fed, although Bank America vehemently denied it despite the fact that it seemed to have the unusual term that Bank America wasn't responsible for Countrywide's debts (so who was?).

Although Indymac may not have been too big to fail like Countrywide, it was quite possible that the Fed would have arranged a bailout for it too, if it had had enough warning. Even though the chairman of the Senate banking committee had written a letter in late June to Indymac about its possible insolvency and the information in this letter inadvertently wound up in public hands, the FDIC seemed to be unaware of the precarious state of the bank. The FDIC is in charge of monitoring the health of the U.S. banking system and keeps a list of troubled banks. Indymac was not on that list at the time of its disastrous failure. This forced the FDIC to back peddle and claim that Indymac had really been on the list, but had only been put on it shortly 'before' its failure and that is why no one else seems to have known about it. This after the fact claim was inevitable since missing a bank failure that required the second biggest bailout in U.S. history would indicate that the FDIC hadn't the slightest idea of what was going on in the American banking system. .

The death blow to Indymac was a run on the bank which included long lines of suffering elderly and angry account holders who got so out of control that the police had to be called in. The similarities to bank runs in 1930s Depression U.S. were quite obvious. Banks failed then just as Indymac did in 2008 because they were insolvent. Contrary to popular belief, a run does not mean a bank will go under. U.S. banking history has numerous cases of banks surviving runs because their finances were in good shape. Insolvency is what destroys a bank, not the visible run that frequently gets the blame. Indymac management tried to take advantage of this mistaken belief to deflect blame for the banks failure by citing the letter from the chairman of the senate banking committee as the cause. Certainly they weren't going to say it was management incompetence that granted huge numbers of mortgages to people who were unlikely to ever pay them back that destroyed Indymac's finances..

One of the first things the FDIC did when it took over Indymac was stop foreclosures on its bad housing loans. Putting more of them on the books would make Indymac's finances look even worse. How this action was going to be paid for wasn't clear. It was already estimated that the Indymac failure would use up between 10% and 18% of the FDIC's $53 billion deposit insurance fund. One bigger bank failure, such as Wachovia or Washington Mutual, or a number of smaller ones, would wipe this fund out completely. Considering that financial rot permeated the U.S. banking system, nothing was more inevitable than the FDIC itself would require a future government bailout because of its own insolvency.

NEXT: Exposing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - Origins

Daryl Montgomery

Organizer, New York Investing meetup

http://investing.meetup.com/21

From Bailout to Bailout - The Prelude to Bear Stearns Collapse

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

Our video on the material in this post is 'The Bear Stearns Bailout'. It can be found at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G8Mn67rNCFQ

The New York Investing meetup first mentioned in August 2007 that Bear Stearns was likely to fail. Two of Bear's hedge funds had gone under in late July and this helped t0 precipitate a sell off in the U.S. stock market by bringing media attention to the subprime crisis. Even though the subprime crisis had begun by at least December 2006 with the sudden failure of mid-sized mortgage lending company, the financial media failed to recognize its importance until the forced closure of the Bear Stearns funds. The precarious state of Bear Stearns finances that this failure indicated was in turn also missed by the U.S media. As usual, the media took its cues from Wall Street, which remained bullish on Bear Stearns right up to the very end (as was the case for Enron and a number of other major corporate failures).

Furthermore, the September 20, 2007 earnings report indicated everything was fine. Despite the failure of the two hedge funds, Bear Stearns claimed to have earned $1.16 a share. A write off of only $200 million (an insignificant amount for a Wall Street firm) was taken as a charge for closing the funds. Another $700 million of mortgage assets were also written down, also not that great an amount. In the earnings conference call, the CFO stated that he “expect[ed] a return to more favorable conditions next year”, stressed the underlying business was sound, and market dislocations tended to run a quarter or two. The only thing he was correct about was that the market dislocations would only last two more quarters - although he certainly didn't imply that this would be because Bear Stearns would no longer exist after that time.

While the September earnings report was reassuring, Bear Stearns December 20th earnings report was an indication of serious and possibly fatal problems. Suddenly, the company lost $6.90 a share, the first loss in its history (Bear was even profitable in every quarter during the Great Depression). Wall Street analysts were expecting a loss of only $1.79 a share, missing the actual loss by over $5.00 a share. The loss included only $1.9 billion of write downs in subprime mortgage exposure. Despite the indication that analysts had completely missed the extent of Bear Stearns problems, the stock actually went up after the earnings report, instead of sharply falling as it should have. The CEO subsequently 'resigned' - something that usually only takes place when a company is in trouble.

By December 2007, Bear Stearns was hardly unique in suffering losses because of the ever expanding credit crisis. The Federal Reserve attempted to address these system wide problems by creating its first new lending facility, the TAF (term auction facility), which gave it an additional conduit for its money pumping operations. In January 2008, reacting to the further deterioration in the financial system, the Fed cut its funds rate by an additional 1.25%. Bear Stearns, however, could not benefit directly from any of these moves since it was not a commercial bank and was therefore not allowed to borrow money from the Fed, so its situation continued to deteriorate.

Nevertheless, even as late as early March 2008, neither Wall Street, nor the media were ringing any alarm bells that Bear Stearns was about to implode. No Wall Street analyst had a sell recommendation on Bear Stearns stock even though it was about to lose almost all of its value. It apparently didn't bother them that the balance sheet indicated 33 times leverage, an amount that can only be described as enormous and which was greater than any other broker dealer or commercial bank. While the public facade that everything was fine was being maintained by Wall Street, rumors were circulating behind the scenes that Bear Stearns might go under. The big players were quietly getting their money out in what was basically a secret run on the bank.

NEXT: Bailout to Bailout - The Collapse and Rescue of Bear Stearns

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

Subprime Freezes Over

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

In December of 2007, the Bush administration proposed freezing the rates on adjustable subprime mortgages for 5 years. This program was 'voluntary'. Indeed the U.S. government had no legal authority to void valid contractual commercial transactions between parties, one of the most fundamental underpinnings of our economy. Nevertheless, presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and John Edwards both immediately criticized the proposal as not doing enough and advocated an even longer freeze on rates.

While the alleged purpose of this program was to help the 'struggling homeowner', an examination of the details indicated otherwise. Homeowners with fixed-rate mortgages got no relief. Homeowners with non-subprime variable-rate mortgages got no relief. Why were just sub-prime adjustable-rate mortgage holders singled out? The answer is simple, these mortgages were defaulting and would be defaulting at the highest rates. Many of these had been granted at the end of the mortgage boom and were for a substantial percentage of the house price at the time of sale (up to and even exceeding 100%). Mortgages for 100% of equity, especially when housing prices are falling, are the last thing banks want to take back and have to write off on their books. These are guaranteed losses for the bank since the foreclosed house would likely sell for much less than the amount of the mortgage. Any bank that had a large number of this type of defaulted mortgages could become technically insolvent fairly quickly. Mortgage bond holders, many of them big banks and brokers, who had bought bonds containing these loans would also lose out. It is a much better deal for banks to foreclose on mortgages that have been substantially paid down, since they make a big profit on these. These homeowners were the most deserving and required the least assistance, so they should have been the centerpiece of any mortgage relief program - but they weren't. Helping them would mean hurting bank profits.

The proposed freezing of sub-prime mortgage rates also represented the first attempt at price controls on the part of the government. Price controls are an almost universal response to inflation by the authorities and prices for necessities are the most likely to be controlled. While the rise in mortgage payments was preplanned and the exact amounts were known in advance (rarely the case with most inflation,) this was no different from any other attempts to dampen rising prices by freezing them. it was not surprising that this took place first in housing either since it is one of the most basic of necessities. Unfortunately, price controls always have negative consequences. In the case of the mortgage freeze, anyone offering loans in the future would have to demand higher rates to compensate for the possibility that rates might be frozen. Or lenders seeing higher risk in the market would simply not offer loans at all. In both these scenarios future mortgage rates will be higher than they would have been. The government could then solve this problem that it created by offering subsidies (a common second response to increased prices for necessities), most likely through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These government supported enterprises would then wind up dominating the mortgage market so much that it would effectively be completely socialized. By the end of 2007, it looked like this was already taking place.

NEXT: The Fed's (long) Term Auction Facility

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup

For more about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21