Showing posts with label PDCF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label PDCF. Show all posts

Thursday, September 4, 2008

Bailout to Bailout: The Bear Stearns Bailout and Its Aftermath

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

Our video for this posting can be found at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G8Mn67rNCFQ

It was soon realized that the temporary loan given by the Federal Reserve to Bear Stearns would not be enough to keep the company afloat. Indeed this was probably already known before the loan's announcement was made on the afternoon of the 14th. The Fed, particularly the New York regional division, worked feverishly all weekend to find a definitive solution to Bear's insolvency. They decided to have JP Morgan take over Bear at a price of $2.52 a share, a rather sharp haircut to the Friday closing price of $30 a share ... and an even steeper discount to the official book value of $84 to $97 a share for Bear stock, which the CEO had announced was unimpaired only two days earlier.

Not only did JP Morgan get Bear Stearns essentially for free, but the Federal Reserve further guaranteed $30 billion (later reduced to $29 billion) of Bears troubled mortgage bonds. JP Morgan was by no means just a lucky bystander in this transaction. Its CEO sat on the board of governors of the New York Fed and got to influence the decision that proved highly favorable to them - in more ways than one it turned out. JP Morgan was a counter party to a large number of derivatives on Bear Stearns books and Bears failure would probably have sunk JP Morgan shortly thereafter. So the Fed's giveaway bailout of Bear Stearns was also an indirect bailout of JP Morgan. Membership (in the Fed) obviously has its privileges. Bear Stearns not being a Fed member wound up being thrown to the wolves.

While JP Morgan and the Bear Stearns bondholders were winners because of the Fed arranged bailout, stockholders and credit default swap (CDS) holders wound up being the big losers. If Bear Stearns had actually declared bankruptcy, the CDS holders would have had a big payday. However, once again the Fed's interference in the market turned winners who had made the correct investment decision into losers by changing the rules of the game at the last moment.It turned out that the stock holders had more clout and wound up successfully agitating for an increase in the takeover price to $10 a share. Even at that price some of the 'smart money' lost big, including British investor Joe Lewis, who lost over a billion dollars, and renowned mutual fund manager Bill Miller whose fund had large holding of Bear stock. The American taxpayer, as per usual, was put on the hook and would also wind up paying for Bear Stearns mismanagement and the Fed's gifting to JP Morgan.

As a result of being blindsided by Bear Stearns failure, the Fed set up the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) in March of 2008. For the first time in its history, the Fed allowed broker-dealers to also borrow from them, not just commercial banks. Lehman Brothers was an immediate beneficiary of this new program, which probably kept it from failing shortly after Bear Stearns did. The legality of this new Fed operation was at best tenuous, but the Fed seemed to have little concern for following its mandate of controlling inflation or restricting its activities to those specifically granted to it by the U.S government. After all why should the Fed be concerned about such things since it knew the government was unlikely to try to keep it from doing whatever it wanted to do - legal or otherwise.

NEXT: Run on the Bank, 2008 - Indymac

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup

Monday, August 4, 2008

The Inflation Versus Deflation Argument - Part 3

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

For a theory to be valid, it must produce results consistent with reality. Neither the deflationist arguments in Wiemar Germany in the 1920s, nor those made in 2008 in the United States could meet this most basic of all criteria. The contemporary U.S. deflationists are claiming that an era of lower prices is upon us even though consumer prices are continuing to rise and the rise seems to be accelerating. Both groups of deflationists redefined inflation to be something else, or in other words, they changed reality to match their theory instead of the other way around. In neither case was any relationship demonstrated by them between their definition of inflation and changes in consumer prices.

The deflationists claim that inflation is an increase in money supply plus bank credit. While everyone could agree that bank credit in the United States was falling in 2008, the same could not be said for money supply. Their are many definitions of money supply and M3, a broad category that would include the Federal Reserves newly created money pumping operations such as the TAF, TSLF and PDCF was expanding rapidly. Since the deflationist argument would fall apart using their own criteria if M3 figures were used, they chose to look at much narrower definitions of money supply such as M2 to try to support their theory. Even then, M2 was experiencing robust growth of over 6% until the second quarter of 2008, when it slowed to around 1%. This was hardly the dire collapse that the deflationists claimed to be happening.

Logically, the deflationist definition is inherently defective because it considers inflation to be a local rather than a global phenomenon. In an era with worldwide commodity trading, prices are set globally for key components of consumer inflation such as energy and food products, not based on what's happening in a single country. Under such circumstances, currency fluctuations then determine the different rates of inflation between countries.

The deflationists argument is also too limited in that it considers money supply and credit, but not assets. In a rich developed country, people can spend their wealth (liquid and tangible assets) as well and they will if they need to do so to buy necessities. This is exactly what happened in Wiemar Germany, where the middle and even upper classes sold their family's prized possessions in order to eat.

The U.S. deflationists also try to bolster their case with comparisons to what is happening in the United States now and what happened in the deflationary periods of the 1930s U.S and the 1990s Japan. Only the most superficial comparison shows any similarities between the U.S. in 2008 and these earlier time periods. Under closer examination the deflationist comparisons completely fall apart.

NEXT: The Inflation Versus Deflation Argument - Part 4


For notes related to this talk, please see, 'Inflation vs Deflation Argument' at:
http://investing.meetup.com/21/Files

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

For more about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21

Friday, April 25, 2008

Central Bankers Gone Wild

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

The New York Investing meetup has made a companion video to this blog entry. To see it, please go to: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y9kzKAzn2Ig

In the hundred years before the Federal Reserve existed, aggregate inflation in the United States was approximately zero. This does not mean that there was never any inflation, inflation did indeed exist, but that the periods of inflation were offset by periods of deflation so that over a long period of time there were essentially no changes in prices. A new era for inflation began when the Fed was created in 1913. Except for the Great Depression in the 1930s, deflation essentially disappeared from the United States economy and there were only periods of lower or higher inflation. This continuing inflation resulted in a 1923% inflation (based on understated official figures) for the first 95 years of the Fed's existence. Conversely, it could be said that the U.S. dollar had lost 95% of its value during this time. And the remaining 5% seemed to be endangered as well.

The beginning of 2008 saw what was probably the biggest injection of liquidity into the U.S. monetary system by the Fed in history. There were two massive rate cuts separated by only 8 days. First there was a 75 basis point cut in the Funds Rate on January 22nd and this was followed by a 50 basis point cut on January 30th. The previous time the Fed had cut rates by 75 basis points was when the Funds rate was at 20%. The January cut took place from a 4.25% level and was the first inter-meeting cut since the 9/11 crisis. Only two months later the Fed would again cut the Funds rate by another 75 basis point, this time from the 3.00% level. Based on the starting levels, the cuts in the Funds Rate was enormous and took place in a very brief span of time.

The cut in the Funds Rate was by no means all the liquidity that the Fed was pumping into the system. The TAF (Term Auction Facility) auctions were raised from $20 billion to $30 billion each by January and would reach $50 billion for each auction in March. Two additional auction facilities were added to the TAF by March - the TSLF and the PDCF. The TSLF (Term Security Lending Facility) was set up to swap $200 billion of treasuries for illiquid securities being held by the banks. The PDCF (Primary Dealer Credit Facility) opened the Fed's credit operations to the 20 firms that bought treasuries directly from it. The Fed had only lent money to commercial banks during its entire history and the PDCF represented a big extension from its traditional scope of operations.

The impact of the Fed's liquidity boosts caused the money supply to explode. MZM (money with zero maturity and therefore available for immediate use) grew by an over 37% annual rate in the first quarter of 2008. This would have been OK if the economy was expanding by around 37% as well, but the economy was contracting instead. The difference between money supply and economic growth was more than enough to create a massive future inflation problem and possibly even hyperinflation. How much inflation would actually take place was something only time would tell.

NEXT: The Fed's Manipulation of the Stock Market

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup

For more about us, please go to our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21


Monday, April 14, 2008

The Fed's (long) Term Auction Facility


The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

On November 28, 2007 the Federal Reserve started a massive year end injection of liquidity into the financial system. On December 11th, the Fed once again lowered the funds rate a quarter of a point (for a total of 100 basis point drop since the half point cut on September 18th). While neither of these events were extraordinary, what happened the next day was.

On December 12th, the Fed announced the creation of its Term Auction Facility . The TAF program was open to any bank or depository institution, which would be allowed to bid for one-month loans up to the total amount of funds being auctioned off. The winners had a wide-choice of what they could pledge as collateral, including mortgage-backed securities that could not be traded and had no market price. In exchange for their possibly worthless securities, banks and brokers could get cash from the Fed. This new program represented a sea change in Fed operations.

First, the Fed would be offering up sums of money in auctions to banks and depository institutions instead of having them come to the Fed to get a loan. Using the Fed's discount window was usually only done by institutions teetering on insolvency and was carefully avoided by any institution that wanted to preserve its reputation. The Fed finally found a way around this impediment to getting money to struggling banks by offering the money at auction, guaranteeing an injection of liquidity into the system at the amount auctioned off and removing the stigma for those who got the money.

The second major change the TAF introduced was that the Fed was willing to take even worthless paper as collateral for a loan. During its history the Fed usually only accepted treasuries as collateral. With the TAF, it effectively began engaging in subprime lending itself . By doing so, it was bailing out the banks that had foolishly engaged in this practice - and who might have become insolvent if they couldn't get rid of their subprime paper.

When the TAF was announced in December, the original auctions were for $20 billion each. By January 2008, this amount was raised to $30 billion. By March each auction was for $50 billion and two additional Fed lending facilities would be introduced (the TSAF and the PDCF) - breaking even newer ground for Fed operations.

Next: Economic Predictions for 2008

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup

For more about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21