Tuesday, August 5, 2008

The Inflation Versus Deflation Argument - Part 5

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.



If the deflationists aren't really discussing consumer price inflation, what is it that they are really talking about? To figure this out, it is helpful to seperately analyze the two components of the deflationist argument, bank credit and money supply, since they operate in very different ways and combining them obfuscates the picture.

Since people don't take out a bank loan to buy a quart of milk or a tank of gas, but they do borrow to buy a house and financial instruments, there is a direct relationship between bank credit and asset prices. The effects of increases or decreases in bank credit are likely to show up relatively quickly in prices for real estate, bonds, and stocks. Only much lately are they likely to impact consumer prices and even then they will represent only one of many components (currency exchange rates being potentially far more important).

This proposed direct relationships between credit and asset prices and currency and consumer prices seems to be well supported by real world observations. In the late 1920s U.S. there was a massive increase in credit and strong bull markets in housing, stocks, and bonds, yet consumer prices were dropping. Even though the U.S. currency didn't float at the time, capital was flowing into the New York from around the world and if the value of the dollar had been market driven, it's exchange rate would have been rising. A similar picture exists for Japan in the 1980s, although there was an even more massive asset bubble and the Yen was experiencing a far more significant rise that the U.S. dollar would have had in the 1920s.

In contrast, the U.S. in the 2000s was a period of declining currency values, the dollar peaked in 2002 and lost more than a third of its value by 2008. Bank credit expansion during this period led to massive bubbles in real estate and related debt instruments, with the S&P testing its 2000 bubble high in late 2007. When bank credit began its severe retraction, prices for real estate, non-government bonds, and stocks had significant drops. Consumer prices on the other hand accelerated higher. One major reason was the rising price in commodities. Since commodities are priced in dollars, they will go up if the U.S. dollar goes down.

The other component of the deflationist argument, money supply, has an obvious lagged effect on consumer prices. Changes can show up many years later. An examination of a money supply chart from the 1970s illustrates this quite clearly. M3 growth peaked in 1971, yet U.S. consumer price inflation didn't have an intermediate term peak until 1974 and the final high wasn't reached until 1980. The large rise in M3 in 2008 isn't likely to have its full impact on consumer inflation until some time in the 2010s.

Since deflation inevitably follows serious inflation, the deflationists at some point will be correct that there will be deflation in the United States. Worrying about deflation now though is like closing your windows and turning up your heat in May because you are worried about a cold winter coming.

For notes related to this talk, please see, 'Inflation vs Deflation Argument' at:http://investing.meetup.com/21/Files

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

For more about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21

Monday, August 4, 2008

The Inflation Versus Deflation Argument - Part 4

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

While it is true that the U.S. experienced consumer price deflation in the 1930s and Japan did so in the 1990s and both experienced sharp drops in bank credit, there are few if any other similarities to the current situation in the United States in 2008. The situation in the 1930s U.S. and 1990s Japan is also a bit more nuanced that the deflationists would have you believe. In the late 1920s, the U.S. did see a big rise in money supply and credit, just as occurred in the U.S. in the early 2000s. According to the deflationists, this should have resulted in rising U.S. consumer prices at some point. It did not. Prices actually fell between 1926 and 1929. A similar thing happened in Japan in 1986. While consumer price deflation did appear in Japan after its banking system literally fell apart, it didn't show up consistently until 1999, nine years after the Japanese asset bubble began to burst. Based on these observations, the relationship between consumer prices and money supply and credit seem to be rather tenuous at best.

The deflations in the 1930s U.S. and 1990s Japan did have an important element in common that does not exist today - dropping commodity prices. As early as the spring of 1929, farm commodities in the U.S. experienced a sharp drop. All commodities declined in the crash month of October and then they crashed themselves in the spring of 1930 . While commodity prices didn't crash in the 1990s, they were weak throughout the decade. Oil reached its price low of just over $10 a barrel in 1998. Ten years later it would be almost 15 times higher. Not only were commodities not declining in the 2000s, but they were experiencing major price increases resulting in significant inflation in the U.S. and most of the world. The commodity picture in the 2000s was just the opposite of the early 1930s U.S. and 1990s Japan.

The import/export and deficit picture has no similarity to the contemporary U.S. either. In the late 1920s, the U.S. had a massive trade surplus and was the biggest creditor nation in the world. Its boom had been built on exports as was the case for Japan in the later twentieth century. Drops in exports damaged both economies. On the other hand, the U.S. in the 2000s was the biggest debtor nation in the world having both a massive trade deficit and government debt, which required heavy borrowing and had inflationary implications. Japan in the 1980s was similar to the U.S. in the 1920s and both were very dissimilar to the U.S. in the 2000s.

Currency also plays a different role in all three scenarios. The U.S. was on the gold standard until 1933 and even after that the currency didn't float. The Japanese yen traded relatively flat during the 1990s. In neither case, did currency have a significant deflationary or inflationary effect, in contrast to the U.S. in 2008 where currency played an inflationary role. The U.S. dollar dropped to all time lows in late 2007 because of the Federal Reserves easy money policy. Since the U.S. imported much more than it exported, this raised import prices and had a bigger inflationary impact than it would have had otherwise.

NEXT: The Inflation Versus the Deflation Argument - Part 5

For notes related to this talk, please see, 'Inflation vs Deflation Argument' at:
http://investing.meetup.com/21/Files

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

For more about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21

The Inflation Versus Deflation Argument - Part 3

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

For a theory to be valid, it must produce results consistent with reality. Neither the deflationist arguments in Wiemar Germany in the 1920s, nor those made in 2008 in the United States could meet this most basic of all criteria. The contemporary U.S. deflationists are claiming that an era of lower prices is upon us even though consumer prices are continuing to rise and the rise seems to be accelerating. Both groups of deflationists redefined inflation to be something else, or in other words, they changed reality to match their theory instead of the other way around. In neither case was any relationship demonstrated by them between their definition of inflation and changes in consumer prices.

The deflationists claim that inflation is an increase in money supply plus bank credit. While everyone could agree that bank credit in the United States was falling in 2008, the same could not be said for money supply. Their are many definitions of money supply and M3, a broad category that would include the Federal Reserves newly created money pumping operations such as the TAF, TSLF and PDCF was expanding rapidly. Since the deflationist argument would fall apart using their own criteria if M3 figures were used, they chose to look at much narrower definitions of money supply such as M2 to try to support their theory. Even then, M2 was experiencing robust growth of over 6% until the second quarter of 2008, when it slowed to around 1%. This was hardly the dire collapse that the deflationists claimed to be happening.

Logically, the deflationist definition is inherently defective because it considers inflation to be a local rather than a global phenomenon. In an era with worldwide commodity trading, prices are set globally for key components of consumer inflation such as energy and food products, not based on what's happening in a single country. Under such circumstances, currency fluctuations then determine the different rates of inflation between countries.

The deflationists argument is also too limited in that it considers money supply and credit, but not assets. In a rich developed country, people can spend their wealth (liquid and tangible assets) as well and they will if they need to do so to buy necessities. This is exactly what happened in Wiemar Germany, where the middle and even upper classes sold their family's prized possessions in order to eat.

The U.S. deflationists also try to bolster their case with comparisons to what is happening in the United States now and what happened in the deflationary periods of the 1930s U.S and the 1990s Japan. Only the most superficial comparison shows any similarities between the U.S. in 2008 and these earlier time periods. Under closer examination the deflationist comparisons completely fall apart.

NEXT: The Inflation Versus Deflation Argument - Part 4


For notes related to this talk, please see, 'Inflation vs Deflation Argument' at:
http://investing.meetup.com/21/Files

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

For more about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21

Friday, August 1, 2008

The Inflation Versus Deflation Argument - Part 2

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

Inflation can only get out of control if the monetary authorities act irresponsibly by failing to stop rising prices and respond with denial and duplicity instead. In general, the worse the denial the greater the final inflation rate. In no case was this more clearly demonstrated than during the German hyperinflation when prices rose a 100 trillion percent between 1914 and 1923. Toward the end, consumer prices more than doubled every two days.

Eminent financiers, economists, politicians and Wiemar government officials all denied that inflation even existed in Germany, at least right up to the time of its final hyper phase and some of them continued with their denials even in the midst of those explosive price increases. Minister of Finance, Helfferich, assured the public that there was no inflation in Germany because the 'value' of currency in circulation was covered by a greater amount of gold reserves than it had been before prices began rising. Eminent professors, Elser and Wolf, echoed his argument. President of the Reichsbank, Havenstein, categorically denied that the German central bank was creating inflation and was convinced he was following a restrictive monetary policy. The Statistical Bureau of the German Government concluded in a study that there was a shortage of currency in Germany, but a great deal of inflation abroad!

How did these government officials and eminent economic authorities justify their continued assertions that there was no inflation despite rapidly rising consumer prices? They used one of the oldest tricks in the book, simply redefining inflation to be something else. By saying X really isn't X, but X is really Y and Y has certain attributes so X must have those attributes, you could of course prove almost anything. And the Wiemar German experts did just that by defining inflation as an in increase in the real value of currency in circulation (instead of the nominal value, which would essentially be the current definition of money supply) plus credit . While the total face value of currency in Germany was increasing dramatically, the total actual value was declining and this was interpreted as 'proof' that deflation was taking place. The accurate interpretation would have been extreme consumer price increases can take place when real money supply and credit are decreasing.

If instead of defining inflation as a function of real money supply and credit, Wiemar economists had defined it as the change in the value of a nations currency, they would have arrived at the correct conclusions about consumer price inflation. The exchange rate of the German mark essentially went to zero as price increases in Germany approached infinity. Since that time, globalization has only made the importance of currency as the key determinant of inflation even more important.

While the mistakes of the Wiemar German officials and financial experts seem laughable today, almost the exact same arguments about inflation began circulating in the U.S. in 2008. If such absurdities only surface prior to a massive outbreak of inflation, serious trouble was obviously ahead for the U.S. financial system.

NEXT: The Inflation Versus Deflation Argument - Part 3

For notes related to this talk, please see, 'Inflation vs Deflation Argument' at:
http://investing.meetup.com/21/Files

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

For more about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21