Showing posts with label subprime. Show all posts
Showing posts with label subprime. Show all posts

Friday, August 31, 2012

Bernanke Makes No New Promises at Jackson Hole



 

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. We have coined this term to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government, which involve unprecedented money printing. This is the official blog of the New York Investing meetup.

Stocks underwent wild gyrations on Friday morning. First the Dow was up over 100 points just after the open on hopes that Fed Chair Bernanke would promise more QE in his Jackson Hole speech. Then, as Bernanke gave his remarks almost the entire rally disappeared. Then a few minutes later the Dow was up 100 points again.

Did anything happen to justify these market movements? The answer is no for the first rally and no for the second rally. Only the selling made sense. There was no promise in the speech for any additional QE in the immediate future. Bernanke did say "the Federal Reserve will provide additional policy accommodation as needed" as he has already stated dozens of times. This is a meaningless platitude that he repeats as often as a mindless parrot. He basically can't take any other position.

Bernanke had to admit that the economy wasn't in really awful shape, but he did emphasize that getting the unemployment rate lower was an important consideration for the FOMC. He did not make any case, nor did he offer proof that doing more quantitative easing would be effective in accomplishing this goal.  He did admit however that, "estimates of the effects of nontraditional policies on economic activity and inflation are uncertain". In other words, the central bank is playing a potentially dangerous game that might have very negative unforeseen consequences in the future.

Bernanke did admit that doing QE could disrupt the Treasury market. He stated that, "if the Federal Reserve became too dominant a buyer in certain segments of these markets, trading among private agents could dry up, degrading liquidity and price discovery".  All of the Fed's actions degrade free markets. That's why they are supposed to be effective. History has shown that markets always dominate in the end however.

Bernanke made it obvious in his speech that he doesn't think any underlying changes have taken place in the economy or financial markets. The ever-insightful Fed Chair also thought in the spring of 2007 that a mountain of subprime mortgage debt posed no risk to the economy or markets. This time Bernanke said, "rather than attributing the slow recovery to longer-term structural factors, I see growth being held back currently by a number of headwinds". Consider the Fed has been taking action since August 2007 (yes, it's been five years) and the economy still is not in great shape, you would think it might occur to him that maybe his policies don't work particularly well (note to readers: many economists are not particularly good at reality-based thinking).

Within the last few days, it has become obvious that Bernanke wouldn't promise anything at Jackson Hole. The QE touts were already making media appearances and publishing articles admitting this, but claiming that the Fed would be taking action at its September meeting. The same people said the Fed would be announcing QE at its June meeting and when that didn't happen, they said it would occur at the July/August meeting. Then it was supposed to take place at Jackson Hole. Now it's going to happen in September. Don't hold your breath.

There is no way the Fed can do QE3 before the election (unless Europe has a major collapse). It would just be too much of a political hot potato. While there are those who state correctly that the Fed has acted prior to presidential elections in the past, that was before the "Audit the Fed" movement started and before the Republicans started criticizing Bernanke's money printing. Romney has already said that if elected, he is going to dump Bernanke. Doing QE again with only the flimsiest of justifications would be seen as a blatant act to help reelect Obama and save his own job. Like QE itself, this could have "uncertain" consequences and many of them could be unpleasant.

The text of Bernanke's speech at Jackson Hole can be found here: http://www.marketwatch.com/story/text-of-bernanke-speech-at-jackson-hole-2012-08-31?pagenumber=2


Disclosure: None

Daryl Montgomery
Author: "Inflation Investing - A Guide for the 2010s"
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

This posting is editorial opinion. There is no intention to endorse the purchase or sale of any security.

Tuesday, April 20, 2010

How Accounting Changes Created Wall Street's Good Earnings

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. We have coined this term to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government, which involve unprecedented money printing. This is the official blog of the New York Investing meetup.


If you can't win under the existing rules of the game, simply change the rules. Wall Street firms were losing big money during the Credit Crisis, but not only did the federal government come to their rescue with truckloads of taxpayer money, but accounting rule changes were also instituted to make their financial position look much stronger. The much improved earnings for the banks and investment houses showing up today are the result of both and not an improved economy.

After a record earnings year in 2007, built on a highly leveraged sub-prime mortgage pyramid, things started to go terribly wrong on Wall Street in 2008. Mark to market accounting was forcing firms to value their sub-prime paper at fire sale prices. This was causing massive losses. Wall Street's friends in the federal government launched a massive counteroffensive, including TARP - the welfare for Wall Street banker's bill, approximately half a dozen new Fed policies that supported the market for Wall Street's junk paper, legislation to hold up the housing market to give underlying value to that paper, and a change in accounting rules that would allow the big banks to look like they were making money even if they weren't.

Citigroup's first quarter 2010 earnings report provides a good example of the better earnings through accounting chemistry approach. Many market observers maintained that Citi was insolvent during the Credit Crisis. The U.S. Treasury wound up buying 27% of Citigroup's shares to help keep the company afloat. In reaction to the Credit Crisis debacle, Citi set up a company, Citi Holdings, to isolate its questionable assets. That entity had losses of $5.49 billion in the first quarter of 2009. It only lost $876 million in the first quarter of this year. The difference improved Citigroup's earnings in Q1 2010 by $4.61 billion. Total earnings reported for Citi in the quarter were $4.43 billion, so it would have lost money without the boost from Citi Holdings. Nevertheless, mainstream media reports were aglow with Citi's great earning's recovery.

The change in accounting rules took place between September 2008 and April 2009. On September 30, 2008 the SEC and FASB, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, issued a joint announcement that stated that forced liquidations of securities, meaning subprime junk debt, were not indicative of fair value. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which was passed a few days later on October 3rd, codified this into law by allowing the SEC to suspend existing accounting rules if doing so was thought to be in the best interests of the public. In actuality, the 'best interests' being protected were the Wall Street's. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley stock price's hit bottom and began rallying the next month. On March 16, 2009, FASB proposed allowing companies to use more leeway in valuing their assets under "mark-to-market" accounting and this eased balance-sheet pressures on the big banks by letting them cross out the old bad numbers and start replacing them with much better looking new numbers. The overall stock market bottomed right around this date.

The accounting changes came too late to save Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers of course. Bear went under in March 2008 and the events surrounding its demise indicate that existing Wall Street accounting numbers already had a large fantasy component before the gutting of mark-to-market for subprime junk. Bear Stearns was trying to expedite a good first quarter earnings report before it collapsed. When the feds arranged for it to be bought by JP Morgan, they valued it at $2 a share. The book value for Bear Stearns was around $90. If people at the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department think that $90 really means $2 for a Wall Street company, the individual investor might want to take the hint. These people have a lot more information about what is really going on than you do. If they don't believe the numbers, why should you?

Disclosure: None applicable.

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

This posting is editorial opinion. Like all other postings for this blog, there is no intention to endorse the purchase or sale of any security.

Wednesday, August 12, 2009

More on the Real Estate 'Recovery'

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

Our Video Related to this Blog:

The bubble in real estate caused the Credit Crisis and cleaning up the mess in real estate is the key to getting the financial system and ultimately the economy back to normal functioning. Articles have appeared in the mainstream press stating that residential real estate has bottomed and prices are headed up. You would have to ignore the overwhelming amount of bad news coming out of the real estate sector in order to believe this.

The Mortgage Banker's Association recent numbers for mortgage applications for home purchases are falling. The four-week moving average is down 0.7%. So demand is down during the heavy buying summer season. So prices are supposedly going up, even though demand is falling. Well that could happen if supply was falling even faster as is the case with oil. Don't hold your breadth though. The worse form of real estate supply is still rising rapidly. Mortgage defaults are expected to come in at 3.85 million this year compared to 2.7 million last year according to Moody's.com.

It is estimated that 14 million (out of a total of 52 million) mortgage holders in the U.S. had negative equity in their homes by the end of the first quarter of this year. Moody's predicts that that number will rise to 17.5 million by the first quarter of 2010. In a recent report, Deutsche bank estimates that nearly half of U.S. mortgage holders will have negative equity in their homes by the first quarter of 2011. By the first quarter of this year, 50% of subprime borrowers were underwater as were 77% of Option-ARM mortgage. Mortgages on homes with negative equity are where defaults and foreclosures come from. There seems to be a potentially unlimited supply of these in the next few years.

Home builder Toll Brothers earnings report today illustrates quite clearly how the mainstream media is handling real estate coverage. The report was described as upbeat. Toll said that signed contracts were up 44% and only 9% of buyers backed out. While the percentages look good, the total number of homes sold were only 792. Toll also stated that demand was so strong that it scaled back on incentives. Revenue was down 44% however because of much lower prices charged for their houses. Slashing prices at that level seems like one giant incentive to me. The market is also so 'good' that Toll is writing down its land and house inventory by $90 to $160 million. The stock of course went up on the upbeat news of collapsing revenue and massive write downs. You should assume that the overall U.S. real estate market is just as 'upbeat' as the Toll Brothers earnings report.

NEXT: Fed's Actions Speak Louder Than Words

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer,New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

This posting is editorial opinion. Like all other postings for this blog, there is no intention to endorse the purchase or sale of any security.






Monday, November 17, 2008

T & A and the GS-20 Summit

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

Our Video Related to this Blog:

Last Wednesday Treasury Secretary Paulson announced the T&A would be taken out of TARP (the Wall Street bailout bill passed in early October). The raison d'etre given by the Bush administration to congress for passing TARP was that only by purchasing troubled assets on bank balance sheets could banks be freed up to lend again and get the economy going. After the legislation was passed, congressional leadership from both parties announced with great fanfare how they were saving the American economy with this program. The ink was barely dry on the bill however, before Paulson announced that preferred stock was going to be purchased in troubled financial institutions instead. While the first $250 billion will still be earmarked for that purpose, Paulson has now decided that the remaining funds should be used to support financial markets that supply credit for credit card debt, auto loans and student loans. Of course next week, there might be a better way to save the American economy and the six week old program could be changed even again. If all this looks like no one in Washington has the slightest idea what they are doing, it's because they don't.

This is not to say that the new ideas for TARP are not an improvement on the original provisions of the bill which were essentially a form of welfare for Wall Street. Unlike welfare for the poor though, welfare for the rich comes with fewer limitations. While TARP has a provision for 'restriction' of bonuses, it doesn't eliminate them, nor does it force companies that can't continue to exist without government support to pay their executives salaries that top government officials would get. Nevertheless, over the weekend seven top Goldman Sachs (Paulson's old firm) managers graciously renounced their bonuses for 2008. Why they would have been getting bonuses when the company's stock has fallen 70% in the last twelve months is not exactly clear. CEO Lloyd Blankfein received a Wall Street record $68 million bonus last year when he was making the decisions that lead to this year's disastrous performance.

Like everything else in the contemporary economy, lack of effective ideas for handling the credit crisis is global as well. The GS-20 meeting of world leaders this weekend in Washington produced mostly a commitment to free trade and further monetary and fiscal stimulus (in other words governments throughout the world are going to print more paper money which will be backed by nothing other than their leaders hot air). British PM Gordon Brown, who decided to sell half of Britain's gold at the bottom of the market in 1999 and has presided over a worse subprime crisis than in the U.S., led the charge for increased stimulus measures. Other ideas bandied about included multinational supervision for global banks, more oversight for credit rating agencies and regulation for hedge funds. These useful suggestions didn't get much beyond the bandying stage however. Essentially anything concrete was put off until the next meeting in April. The do-nothing summit was immediately declared a success by President Bush.

Shortly thereafter, Japan announced a second quarter of negative GDP confirming it was in recession as the euro zone did last Friday. Since this was not exactly surprising news, Asian markets were little changed overnight, even despite the drop in the U.S. on Friday. The out of the blue rally in American markets last Thursday faded almost as quickly as it arriveed with the Dow down 3.8% and the Nasdaq down 5.0%. Technically speaking this was another crash day on the Nasdaq, but as I have said many times, no one pays attention anymore to just a 5% or 6% drop - and that includes world leaders.

NEXT: Trojan Horse of Earnings Surprises

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

This posting is editorial opinion. Like all other postings for this blog, there is no intention to endorse the purchase or sale of any security.






Thursday, October 23, 2008

The House of Cards Economy

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

Our Video Related to this Blog:

Housing continues to deteriorate. There are now 12 million homes in the U.S. with mortgages that exceed their value. This pool of houses which is particularly vulnerable to abandonment and foreclosure represents almost a quarter of all mortgaged residential properties . By the end of 2008, it is estimated that there will be a million bank owned properties for sale, which would represent a third of homes on the market. The situation is already much worse in trend leader California, where over 50% of existing home sales were foreclosed properties last month. Median prices there have dropped 34% from the high so far. The rest of the U.S. could follow California, although increased government efforts to prop up the housing market are trying to prevent further erosion.

Last quarter 766,000 U.S. home owners received at least one foreclosure notice. Only six states accounted for a majority of foreclosure activity - Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, Nevada, and Ohio. The last four of these states are battlegrounds in the presidential election and Arizona would be too if McCain didn't represent it in the senate (nevertheless McCain's lead in the polls there is surprisingly small even though Arizona is one of the states most likely to support a Republican candidate for president). Foreclosures were worse in the beginning of the quarter and the rate even declined by 12% in September. While it looks like the number of foreclosure notices will be lower in the future, this won't be taking place because of improvements in the housing market.

The rate is being lowered by new laws have been enacted in a number of states to delay the repossession process and the FHA is attempting to renegotiate loan terms for a number of mortgage holders at risk. Foreclosure statistics are indeed very much affected by the ease of foreclosure which varies by state and should not be considered as an absolute indication of the strength of a state's housing market. New York for instance currently has a low foreclosure rate because it is necessary to go to court first and this means a foreclosure can take well over a year, longer if the judge doesn't wish to be cooperative. The FDIC is also trying to delay or prevent foreclosures. The first thing they did when they took over IndyMac was to stop all foreclosures and they are continuing to do so.

Delay does not mean preventing the inevitable however, it usually only means it only takes more time to get there. U.S. housing was in a bubble and prices became way extended on the upside. They are going to have to come down at least to the long-term mean - and we still have a long way to go to get there - before a sustainable recovery in real estate is possible. This will be an important precondition to a healthy economy as well. A look at the past suggests this linkage. Housing prices fell approximately 50% nationally in the U.S. between 1930 and 1940. The economy wasn't in such great shape then either.

NEXT: Black Friday Panic Grips World Markets

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

This posting is editorial opinion. Like all other postings for this blog, there is no intention to endorse the purchase or sale of any security.

Monday, September 29, 2008

Three Bank Monty - Monday's Global Bank Failures

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

Our Video Related to this Blog:

The nationalization of the world's banking systems took a big step forward on Monday, with major bank failures happening in the U.S., England, and the European continent. In all cases, the respective governments are getting a piece of the action. While it is generally acknowledged that socializing anything will lead to inefficient operations, general dysfunctionality, and substandard practices, apparently the governments of a number of developed economies have decided that socialized banking is an important component of the solution to the current economic crisis. These are of course the same geniuses that created the government policies that allowed the current economic crisis to take place and then remained completely oblivious to them as they unfolded.

In the U.S., Wachovia now no longer exists. Only last week it was the fourth largest American bank. Over the weekend the FDIC 'facilitated' troubled financial giant Citigroup's purchase of Wachovia's banking operations. Wachovia's own demise can be traced back to its takeover of mortgage lender Golden West Financial in 2006. Citigroup is supposed to be absorbing $42 billion in Wachovia's losses, but this will not happen if the banking bailout plan passes because the bill states that the taxpayers pick up the tab in such circumstances. The FDIC is supposed to cover any remaining losses and in exchange for doing so will get $12 billion in preferred stock. Nevertheless, in a statement that seems to lack both truth and consistency, the FDIC said that the Wachovia bailout won't cost its deposit insurance fund anything. Even though Wachovia's stock fell to 91 cents in Monday's before the bell trading (under one dollar is the market's statement that a company is insolvent), the FDIC claimed the Wachovia did not fail. If you believe that, you are also likely to believe that a pile of manure is a mountain or roses. Wachovia is indeed the largest bank failure in U.S. history (at least for now).

While Wachovia was collapsing in the U.S., the Benelux countries (Belgium, Luxenbourg and the Netherlands) had to bailout Fortis NV with a $16.4 billion cash infusion. In return, the three governments will get a 49% stake in the bank. The demise of Fortis should be seen as a derivative implosion similar to that which brought down U.S. insurance giant AIG. Fortis has had to write down its credit default swaps (CDOs) by 78% so far and this essentially made it insolvent. As was the case for Wachovia, the downward spiral for Fortis was also caused by it taking over a financial company with a dicey lending book. Fortis was part of a three bank consortium that purchased ABN Ambro in October 2007 (long after the credit crisis was front page news). The lead bank in that consortium, Royal Bank of Scotland, is on New York Investing's likely to fail bank list and its stock was down 11% in early Monday trading.

England doesn't have to wait for a future bank failure however. The British government on Monday was forced to nationalize Bradford and Bingley, taking over its $91 billion mortgage operation. The Brits also paid Spain's Banc Santander $33 billion to 'facilitate' its purchase of Bradford and Bingley's savings business. Bradford and Bingley specialized in mortgages for rental properties and it was reported that there had been no income verification for at least 17% of its loans. This was the second bank nationalization in England, Northern Rock was the first, and followed the government arranged purchase of HBOS Plc by Lloyds TSB Group only nine days ago. It is quite obvious that it will not be the last either. Total mortgage lending in Great Britain has fallen 95% (yes 95%) in the previous month. A credit collapse of this magnitude makes the dislocations of the 1930s Great Depression pale in comparison.

NEXT: A Bridge Loan to Nowhere - The Wall Street Bailout Plan

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

This posting is editorial opinion. Like all other postings for this blog, there is no intention to endorse the purchase or sale of any security.

Friday, September 12, 2008

Probable Future Outlook for the United States

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

Guest Blogger: Trevor Gauntlett from 'Running the Gauntlett'

What concerns me most is looking at the highly probable future outlook for the U.S. …

The government is taking over Freddie and Fannie, which will help out new, but not existing home buyers. By assuming responsibility for their debt, the gov’t is using inflation adjusted tax dollars to keep these companies operating . However, a $500 billion dollar short fall is projected this year in the budget and the U.S. national debt is already at about 9.7 trillion and growing ever so rapidly. If we tack on unfunded liabilities, we are talking anywhere from 50-70 trillion in obligations. Effectively the government is insolvent. Now what happens when government revenues begin to decline due to the slowing economy, baby boomers start to take money out of social security and access Medicare when they retire, and the continuation of the Iraq war / Afghan war / maybe Iran war?

I’m failing to see the light at the end of the tunnel.

During the housing boom, U.S. consumers purchased houses because money was cheap. Everyone felt rich so they purchased more consumables for immediate gratification. These weren't investments with productive value that would add to the economy in the future and they experienced immediate depreciation. Once U.S. consumers could no longer get money out of their homes through refinancings and HELOCs (home equity lines of credit), we started using our credit cards. Look at who is producing and who is consuming… we in the USA are primarily guilty of the latter and it is all funded through the rest of the world’s savings. At some point other countries are going to refuse to continue supporting the U.S. spending binge - this might already be taking place.

As for housing it will have to come back down to reasonable values. If we encounter a period of hyperinflation then housing could be a good asset to hold onto (although this was not the case during the hyperinflation in Wiemar Germany in the early 1920s). On the other hand, if we have a depression I could argue the opposite.

People are already losing their HELOCs because banks are worried that consumers won’t be able to afford them. Legal or not this is happening. I also heard from a Real Estate agent in Seattle that banks are asking for 25% down on new mortgages. In an earnings call in late January 2008, Bank of America executives said credit card delinquencies in California, Florida, Arizona, and Nevada—states with high foreclosure rates—increased five times as fast as in other states, suggesting that consumers struggling with their mortgage debt are also finding their credit card bills hard to pay. “We’re focused on getting paid for the risk we take,” said Joe Price, chief financial officer. - US News and World report 2/28/2008.

What happens if the United States dollar loses its status as the reserve currency? Then everyone with dollars will flood the market to get rid of them. The dollar is a commodity just like gold and silver, but unlike gold and silver any amount of it can easily be created. It has no intrinsic value and is a exchangeable commodity and legal tender because of government fiat (hence paper money is fiat money or fiat currency). If people want dollars, the price rises and as people desire them less, the price falls. Loss of reserve currency status would mean the demand for U.S. dollars would fall significantly. Why would anyone want dollars when you look at the future for the US economy except because of necessity or political reasons?

The GSE bailout will help to prolong the issues that the financial industry is facing. The United States government will do everything in its power to support the system through money creation and taxation, giving individuals and institutions more time to pull their money out of the dollar. An immediate collapse would make that very difficult and costly.

I’m getting the sense that things could get a whole lot worse than any of us imagine.

NEXT: The Banks and Brokers Most Likely to Fail - The Big Players

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

This posting is editorial opinion. Like all other postings for this blog, there is no intention to endorse the purchase or sale of any security.

Thursday, September 11, 2008

Exposing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - The Government Takeover

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

Our video for this posting can be found at: TBA

It took only about six weeks after congress passed a bailout package before the U.S. government had to take direct control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The terms of the bailout package were open ended and extremely generous at Treasury Secretary Paulson's insistence. He claimed that if it was made obvious that the full financial power of the United States government was behind Fannie and Freddie, the need to take any action would be minimized (despite the fact that is was universally agreed that Freddie was insolvent and would therefore need continual cash infusions to keep operating). The Congressional Budget Office backed up Paulson by estimating that there was a greater than a 50% chance that the bailout would cost nothing.

On September 7th, the U.S. government seized Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, firing their top management and taking direct control of their operations. The Treasury department announced almost immediately that it would initially be pumping $200 billion into the two companies (so much for the bailout costing taxpayers nothing). Auditors who had been examining Freddie and Fannie's books found that Freddie had made accounting decisions that pushed losses into the future and postponed a capital shortfall until the fourth quarter of 2008, which it wouldn't have had to disclose until early 2009. Fannie Mae had used similar methods, but to a lesser degree. Both companies needed capital and a lot of it to keep operating. One wondered how many U.S. banks and brokers were doing similar things with their books, but the public didn't know about it because there were no outside auditors to tell them.

With the government takeover, Fannie and Freddie's over $5 trillion in debt would now reasonably have to be added to the official U.S. national debt figures. Adding Fannie and Freddie's total debt to the national debt would increase it to between $14 or $15 trillion or roughly the size of the official GDP figures (the actual GDP figures were much lower than those claimed by the government and the actual national debt, including social security, medicare and medicaid entitlements was somewhere around 50 to 60 trillion dollars). Ironically, the idea of privatizing Fannie Mae was conceived of in the 1960s during the Johnson administration to get its debt off the government's books.

The government bailout was intended to support Fannie and Freddie's bonds, many of which were held by foreign governments including China and Russia. U.S. banks and thrifts also held an estimated $1 trillion of this debt. If Fannie and Freddie defaulted on their bonds, the U.S. would have had great difficulty ever borrowing again from foreign sources and both our government and economy would wind up seizing up almost immediately. A number of U.S. banks would likely have gone under soon thereafter as well in the event of a bond default. While bonds holders got bailed out, the stockholders were wiped out. This included U.S. pension funds, most of whom were major holders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stock.

Fannie and Freddie were by far the largest bailout in U.S. financial history. Where would the already debt ridden U.S. government get the money to pay for it? If it couldn't borrow the money, which was indeed likely, it would have to print it. Only time would tell how much inflation this would cause and how much value the U.S dollar would lose as a result .

NEXT: Probable Future Outlook for the United States

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

This posting is editorial opinion. Like all other postings for this blog, there is no intention to endorse the purchase or sale of any security.

Tuesday, September 9, 2008

Exposing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - The Bailout

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

Our video for this posting can be found at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q8XU5XhwdyY..

In mid-July 2008, Fannie and Freddie's stock prices were plummeting, with Freddies stock getting into the low single digits. Knowing that they had to do something right away, the Federal Reserve and Treasury department announced emergency measures to rescue the two companies. First, the Fed opened its discount window to Fannie and Freddie, something that had only been available to commercial banks for more than seven decades until broker-dealers also got access to the Fed in March 2008 (it was clear that the expansion of this privilege to more and more industries was a trend in the making). Secondly, the Treasury department went to Congress with a bailout plan. Secretary Paulson asked for a blank check from the U.S. government on behalf of Fannie and Freddie on the grounds that just having such strong financial backing would prevent their problems from getting worse. In less than two months the U.S. government would be forced to take direct control of both institutions, indicating that this was either one of biggest lies or most imbecilic statements in U.S. financial history.

The U.S. congress passed the 'Federal Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008' in late July. In the bill, Paulson got the blank check he requested, at least until the end of 2009. Provisions were also made to give up to 400,000 homeowners lower fixed-rate interest rates loans and an additional $3.9 billion was allocated for neighborhood grants (which seemed to be some pork barrel provision). The bill also established a new regulator for Fannie and Freddie to replace OFHEO. There was nothing wrong per se with OFHEO's regulation, other than every time it tried to control Fannie or Freddie, powerful politicians stepped in to prevent it. Of course, the politicians responsible for creating the Fannie and Freddie mess were not going to put the blame on themselves, but tried to make OFHEO the fall guy instead.

Without question, the most outrageous part of the bailout bill was its cost estimate. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicted it would cost only $25 billion (the same as the cost they predicted for the Iraq War, now estimated by a recent outside study to be over 100 times higher at $3.2 trillion). The CBO even made the preposterous statement that there was a greater than 50% chance the bailout would cost U.S. taxpayers nothing. What thinking, or lack thereof, led to this conclusion is not clear. Since everyone agreed that Freddie Mac was insolvent, by definition it would have to have money pumped into it to keep it operating. So from the beginning there was a zero percent chance that the bailout would cost nothing.

There is certainly evidence that Congress itself had a more realistic assessment of the potential bailout costs. As part of the rescue package, they raised the national debt ceiling $800 billion (the sixth time the national debt ceiling was raised during the Bush administration) to $10.6 trillion. If the bailout was going to cost only $25 billion, there was no need for a higher debt ceiling. Clearly the cost estimates were meant for a gullible public, not Washington insiders who knew the truth. It was the New York Investing meetup's opinion that the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bailout would cost U.S. taxpayers at least a trillion dollars - and even that might be an optimistic projection.

NEXT: Exposing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - Future Risks

Daryl Montgomery.
Organizer, New York Investing meetup.
http://investing.meetup.com/21.

This posting is editorial opinion. Like all other postings for this blog, there is no intention to endorse the purchase or sale of any security.

Monday, September 8, 2008

Exposing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - Subprime Crisis

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

Our video for this posting can be found at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pQjgEAMa5SA.

By August 2007, it became clear that the U.S. housing market was in trouble. Banks and brokers were starting to face massive write downs for all the irresponsible home loans they had been granting for the previous several years and this was causing available mortgage money to dry up. Federal government officials, including President Bush, the Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, the Fed chair Ben Bernanke, the head of the Senate Finance committee Chris Dodd and his counterpart in the House Barney Frank, unanimously supported using government backed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to help prop up the faltering mortgage market. While this was done purportedly to help struggling home buyers, it was in reality an attempt to help the U.S. banking system. The likelihood that the U.S. taxpayer would be stuck with one huge bill because of these actions didn't seem to have been considered - and if it was, no federal official or representative seems to have been bothered by it.

Fannie and Freddie were encouraged to buy dicier loans, particularly Alt-A. Even some subprime loans started showing up on their books. Together these loans accounted for as much as 20% of the total debt they backed by the first half of 2008. A similar percentage of loans on their books were for over 80% of the original home price and since housing prices were falling, this percentage for actual home value was not only much higher, but growing rapidly. Caps on the size of a mortgage that Fannie could handle were raised substantially at that time to over $700,000. These actions along with the diminished role of banks in mortgage lending wound up creating a de facto nationalization (the de jure nationalization would come later) of the American mortgage market. In the last half of 2007, Fannie and Freddie backed 90% of mortgages in the United States and 81% in first half of 2008.

As a consequence of government policies, the condition of these already financially weakened and corruption plagued companies deteriorated even further. The leverage, calculated as liabilities divided by shareholder equity, that Fannie Mae was utilizing rose to an eye popping 78 to 1, more than double the 33 to 1 leverage that caused Bear Stearns to implode overnight. This huge leverage was made possible with the complicity of Fannie and Freddie's regulator (OFHEO) who kept lowering the capital surplus requirements the companies needed to maintain, first from 30% to 20% and then to 15%. This allowed Fannie and Freddie to continually state to the press that they had much more capital on hand than the minimum amount set by their regulator and thereby imply that they were in a sound financial state, even though they were not.

In fact, by the first quarter of 2008, Freddie's liabilities exceeded it assets by $5.2 billion. Based on the basic principles of accounting, it was an insolvent company. While this information was public, other than the New York Investing meetup, few seemed to notice this obvious fact. Only when a former Fed official made a public statement pointing out that the emperor had no clothes in July 2008, did the problems with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac suddenly receive major press and government attention.

NEXT: Exposing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - The Bailout

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

This posting is editorial opinion. Like all other postings for this blog, there is no intention to endorse the purchase or sale of any security.

Saturday, September 6, 2008

Exposing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - Origins

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.


Our video for this posting can be found at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ennn4Qq8MUY.

After the market close on September 4th, 2008, it was announced that the U.S. government would likely be taking over mortage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in what would be the biggest financial bailout in U.S. history. Congress had already passed a bailout bill a month earlier making this action possible. The New York Investing meetup had already predicted that the need for the bailout the previous fall. This topic was raised in the December 2007 meeting and in the April 2008 meeting, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were on our list of the dirtiest dozen financial companies.

The origins of Fannie and Freddie were innocent enough and didn't presage their ultimate blowup many years later. New Deal mortage progams actually started with the FHA, which was created in 1934 to insure mortgages that had less than a 20% down payment (most mortgages in the 1920s had much higher down payments). Fannie Mae was then established in 1938 to buy FHA mortgages, creating a secondary mortgage market. For the first 30 years of its existence Fannie Mae had limited impact on the U.S. housing market because it had acess to little credit and significant restrictions on the size and type of mortage it could back. All of that changed around 1970 however.

That year, the U.S. government ranamed the existing Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, and then created a new Fannie Mae that would be a quasi-govenment backed company that could purchase riskier mortgages (Fannie's charter allowed it buy even 100% mortages as long as the amount over 80% was insured). The reason for making Fannie Mae a publicly traded company was the government wanted to provide expanded mortgage services, but didn't want the debt on its own books. In tandem with Fannie Mae's creation, Freddie Mac was also created as a GSE (government supported enterprise). Its purpose was to package mortgages into bonds, known as mortgage backed securities (MBSs) and sell them to investors thereby recycling the capital available for mortages. Freddie didn't become a fully traded public company until 1989.

The scope and extent of Fannie's operations expanded greatly in the 1980s and 90s. In 1978, Fannie was allowed to back mortgages for multifamily dwellings. In 1981, it added adjustable rate mortgages to its operations and in 1983, even riskier second mortgages. At the same time, the maximum amount of a mortgage that Fannie could back was also rising going from
$108,300 in 1980 t0 $252,700 in 2000. After 2000, this amount increased at a much faster clip, reaching $417,000 in 2006 and $730,000 for awhile in 2008. By raising the mortgage caps repeatedly, the U.S government created a bubble feedback loop that made the U.S. housing bubble possible - housing prices went up; the amount of a mortgages that could be gotten by a homebuyer went up; housing prices went up again; and the amount of a available mortgage went up again and so on and so on.

Between 2001 and 2007 alone, the amount of mortgages backed by Fannie Mae went from 2.5 trillion to $5.0 trillion. U.S. housing prices approximately doubled as well during this same period. Most amazingly, all of this took place even though one of Fannie and Freddie's major purposes was to increase home ownership for the poor. Acting to constantly support higher and higher U.S. housing prices didn't seem to be a particularly efficacious approach to accomplishing this goal.

NEXT: Exposing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - Corruption

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

Friday, September 5, 2008

Run on the Bank 2008 - Indymac

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

Our video for this posting can be found at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NqBhR1kkWHY.

Indymac was a large savings and loan that had split off from Countrywide, the largest mortgage provider in the United States, in 1997. Both were heavily involved in granting mortgages in the real estate bubble markets of the southwestern United States. Countrywide itself experienced a run on the bank in August 2007 in the earliest phase of the subprime crisis. Only an emergency cash infusion from Bank America, arranged by the Federal Reserve, kept it afloat. This was only a stopgap measure however and Bank America agreed to take over Countrywide in early 2008. This deal was also apparently secretly arranged by the Fed, although Bank America vehemently denied it despite the fact that it seemed to have the unusual term that Bank America wasn't responsible for Countrywide's debts (so who was?).

Although Indymac may not have been too big to fail like Countrywide, it was quite possible that the Fed would have arranged a bailout for it too, if it had had enough warning. Even though the chairman of the Senate banking committee had written a letter in late June to Indymac about its possible insolvency and the information in this letter inadvertently wound up in public hands, the FDIC seemed to be unaware of the precarious state of the bank. The FDIC is in charge of monitoring the health of the U.S. banking system and keeps a list of troubled banks. Indymac was not on that list at the time of its disastrous failure. This forced the FDIC to back peddle and claim that Indymac had really been on the list, but had only been put on it shortly 'before' its failure and that is why no one else seems to have known about it. This after the fact claim was inevitable since missing a bank failure that required the second biggest bailout in U.S. history would indicate that the FDIC hadn't the slightest idea of what was going on in the American banking system. .

The death blow to Indymac was a run on the bank which included long lines of suffering elderly and angry account holders who got so out of control that the police had to be called in. The similarities to bank runs in 1930s Depression U.S. were quite obvious. Banks failed then just as Indymac did in 2008 because they were insolvent. Contrary to popular belief, a run does not mean a bank will go under. U.S. banking history has numerous cases of banks surviving runs because their finances were in good shape. Insolvency is what destroys a bank, not the visible run that frequently gets the blame. Indymac management tried to take advantage of this mistaken belief to deflect blame for the banks failure by citing the letter from the chairman of the senate banking committee as the cause. Certainly they weren't going to say it was management incompetence that granted huge numbers of mortgages to people who were unlikely to ever pay them back that destroyed Indymac's finances..

One of the first things the FDIC did when it took over Indymac was stop foreclosures on its bad housing loans. Putting more of them on the books would make Indymac's finances look even worse. How this action was going to be paid for wasn't clear. It was already estimated that the Indymac failure would use up between 10% and 18% of the FDIC's $53 billion deposit insurance fund. One bigger bank failure, such as Wachovia or Washington Mutual, or a number of smaller ones, would wipe this fund out completely. Considering that financial rot permeated the U.S. banking system, nothing was more inevitable than the FDIC itself would require a future government bailout because of its own insolvency.

NEXT: Exposing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - Origins

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup

Friday, April 18, 2008

Muriel Siebert Discusses the Credit Crisis


The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

At the January 9, 2008 meeting of the New York Investing meetup, I had the pleasure of interviewing stock market legend Muriel Siebert. In 1967, Siebert became the first woman to have a seat on the New York Stock Exchange. In the mid-1970s, she was appointed Superintendent of Banking for New York State. No bank failed under her tenure. In her more than 50-year career on Wall Street, Muriel Siebert had personally witnessed almost the entire post World War II financial era. She had seen it all and had done it all.

Highlights of the this historical interview with Muriel Siebert have been condensed to three eight minute videos, which can be seen at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UHxRCNd0HSI
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bZLsD2DHvLw
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_tL2bOmkMwo

In the interview, Siebert indicated that things had changed considerably since the 1970s, the last period of high U.S. inflation. The U.S. had lost its dominant economic status and emerging economies around the globe were not as dependent on it as that had been previously. She also pointed out how their growth was creating a voracious demand for commodities and the wealth transfer from rising commodity prices enabled the takeover of major U.S. financial institutions by commodity producing countries like the Gulf states. She was not sanguine about the prospects for the U.S. dollar, pointing out that the U.S. needed to cut the deficit considerably to support it and the consequences of doing so would be severe.

Siebert said the she had seen nothing like the subprime crisis during her long career on Wall Street. She thought the abuses had been so extreme and damaging that some people involved in creating the problem should go to jail. Siebert asked, "Where were the regulators?; "Where were the rating agencies?"; and cited mortgage brokers as being key players in generating the large quantity of irresponsible loans. The subprime crisis wasn't the only thing she thought we had to worry about either. She mentioned the collapse of private equity and how this had helped juice the market up and that its loss would cause the stock market to fall.

Siebert pointed out the similarity between how Enron hid its financial activities and the banks had done so in the 2000s by pushing their subprime activities off-shore and off-balance sheet. She stated that under Sarbanes-Oxley that audits should be complete by March 31st and a clearer picture of just how extensive the damage was would begin to emerge. Her opinion was that no one really knew how big the problem was. Siebert mentioned the large amount of derivatives that now exist and the complete lack of regulation for them. She thought the we need global security regulation that should be instituted on a similar model as global banking regulations that are now in place. Siebert thought that there was too much leverage in the system and said this was what really scared her, although she concluded that she didn't see a 'total' collapse of the financial system.

NEXT: Central Bankers Gone Wild

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
For more about us, please go to: http://investing.meetup.com/21


Tuesday, April 15, 2008

Economic Predictions for 2008

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.


The December 12, 2007 meeting of the New York Investing meetup focused on the likely economic scenarios for the coming year. A video, entitled 'Economic Predictions for 2008' summing up these predictions can be found on You Tube at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bZLsD2DHvLw.

The most important themes cited for 2008 were inflation and recession. Even though inflation is and has been under reported by the U.S. government since the 1980s, it was our opinion the even the manipulated numbers, let alone the real ones, would start to become noticeably higher. We predicted that as inflation was climbing, that the U.S. economy was likely to be gripped by recession (with negative job creation in each of the first 3 months of 2008, it now looks like the U.S. economy was in recession in the first quarter of the year). We also pointed out that it was unlikely the government would be reporting that we were in recession (the government GDP figures are unreliable, just like the inflation figures) until the recession was well under way or even over.

A widening out of the credit crisis with credit card debt, car loans and student loans being impacted was also mentioned in the talk (defaults in all of these loan types were rising significantly in the first quarter of 2008). A big drop in commercial real estate and a continuing weakness in residential real estate were also predicted (foreclosures continue to hit multi-year highs).

Special mention was made of the problems with bond insurers (monolines) and how their condition would continue to deteriorate, but the rating agencies might fail to lower their ratings appropriately because of political pressure (the official lowering of the ratings of these companies could lead to financial chaos). Bond insurer SCA's credit rating was lowered substantially in March 2008, but the rating agencies were still mostly maintaining ratings on the industry leaders MBIA and Ambac.

More bailouts of banks and broker-dealers with the assistance of the Fed was also predicted. The behind the scenes purchase of Country Wide Financial by Bank of America as the secret behest of the Federal Reserve (something denied by Bank of America) was given as an example. The Sovereign Wealth fund purchases of parts of major U.S. financial institutions, certainly with the knowledge and approval of the federal authorities, was also cited as a type of bailout that would continue to take place. Citibank in fact received just such a bailout (for the second time) in mid-January. Of course, the Bear Stearns bailout in mid-March was the most spectacular example of the of the accuracy of this prediction.

Finally it was predicted that the U.S. dollar would continue to drop and this would eventually lead to some form of currency intervention by the G7 countries (most likely late in the year, particularly after the election). Unless the Fed choices to raise rates substantially, this intervention will fail.

NEXT: The First Four Trading Days of 2008

Daryl Montgomery
Organinzer, New York Investing meetup

For more about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21.

Monday, April 14, 2008

The Fed's (long) Term Auction Facility


The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

On November 28, 2007 the Federal Reserve started a massive year end injection of liquidity into the financial system. On December 11th, the Fed once again lowered the funds rate a quarter of a point (for a total of 100 basis point drop since the half point cut on September 18th). While neither of these events were extraordinary, what happened the next day was.

On December 12th, the Fed announced the creation of its Term Auction Facility . The TAF program was open to any bank or depository institution, which would be allowed to bid for one-month loans up to the total amount of funds being auctioned off. The winners had a wide-choice of what they could pledge as collateral, including mortgage-backed securities that could not be traded and had no market price. In exchange for their possibly worthless securities, banks and brokers could get cash from the Fed. This new program represented a sea change in Fed operations.

First, the Fed would be offering up sums of money in auctions to banks and depository institutions instead of having them come to the Fed to get a loan. Using the Fed's discount window was usually only done by institutions teetering on insolvency and was carefully avoided by any institution that wanted to preserve its reputation. The Fed finally found a way around this impediment to getting money to struggling banks by offering the money at auction, guaranteeing an injection of liquidity into the system at the amount auctioned off and removing the stigma for those who got the money.

The second major change the TAF introduced was that the Fed was willing to take even worthless paper as collateral for a loan. During its history the Fed usually only accepted treasuries as collateral. With the TAF, it effectively began engaging in subprime lending itself . By doing so, it was bailing out the banks that had foolishly engaged in this practice - and who might have become insolvent if they couldn't get rid of their subprime paper.

When the TAF was announced in December, the original auctions were for $20 billion each. By January 2008, this amount was raised to $30 billion. By March each auction was for $50 billion and two additional Fed lending facilities would be introduced (the TSAF and the PDCF) - breaking even newer ground for Fed operations.

Next: Economic Predictions for 2008

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup

For more about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21

Wednesday, April 9, 2008

Subprime Freezes Over


The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.


In December of 2007, the Bush administration proposed freezing the rates on adjustable subprime mortgages for 5 years. This program was 'voluntary'. Indeed the U.S. government had no legal authority to void valid contractual commercial transactions between parties, one of the most fundamental underpinnings of our economy. Nevertheless, presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and John Edwards both immediately criticized the proposal as not doing enough and advocated an even longer freeze on rates.

While the alleged purpose of this program was to help the 'struggling homeowner', an examination of the details indicated otherwise. Homeowners with fixed-rate mortgages got no relief. Homeowners with non-subprime variable-rate mortgages got no relief. Why were just sub-prime adjustable-rate mortgage holders singled out? The answer is simple, these mortgages were defaulting and would be defaulting at the highest rates. Many of these had been granted at the end of the mortgage boom and were for a substantial percentage of the house price at the time of sale (up to and even exceeding 100%). Mortgages for 100% of equity, especially when housing prices are falling, are the last thing banks want to take back and have to write off on their books. These are guaranteed losses for the bank since the foreclosed house would likely sell for much less than the amount of the mortgage. Any bank that had a large number of this type of defaulted mortgages could become technically insolvent fairly quickly. Mortgage bond holders, many of them big banks and brokers, who had bought bonds containing these loans would also lose out. It is a much better deal for banks to foreclose on mortgages that have been substantially paid down, since they make a big profit on these. These homeowners were the most deserving and required the least assistance, so they should have been the centerpiece of any mortgage relief program - but they weren't. Helping them would mean hurting bank profits.

The proposed freezing of sub-prime mortgage rates also represented the first attempt at price controls on the part of the government. Price controls are an almost universal response to inflation by the authorities and prices for necessities are the most likely to be controlled. While the rise in mortgage payments was preplanned and the exact amounts were known in advance (rarely the case with most inflation,) this was no different from any other attempts to dampen rising prices by freezing them. it was not surprising that this took place first in housing either since it is one of the most basic of necessities. Unfortunately, price controls always have negative consequences. In the case of the mortgage freeze, anyone offering loans in the future would have to demand higher rates to compensate for the possibility that rates might be frozen. Or lenders seeing higher risk in the market would simply not offer loans at all. In both these scenarios future mortgage rates will be higher than they would have been. The government could then solve this problem that it created by offering subsidies (a common second response to increased prices for necessities), most likely through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These government supported enterprises would then wind up dominating the mortgage market so much that it would effectively be completely socialized. By the end of 2007, it looked like this was already taking place.


NEXT: The Fed's (long) Term Auction Facility


Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup


For more about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21








Friday, April 4, 2008

Government Investment Pools Dry Up


The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

While the downgrades of the bond insurers threatened U.S. municipalities with higher future interest costs, it became obvious in November 2007 that there were far more immediate risks to public finances when there was a run on Florida's Local Government Investment Pool . The run began when word got out that the Investment Pool had exposure to $1.5 billion in defaulted and downgraded SIVs. Florida had to freeze withdrawals to prevent the fund from collapsing. The municipalities that got out early were lucky, all others had to find emergency funding to meet their payrolls for police, firemen, hospital workers, teachers, and other employees.

Local, State and Government investment pools existed in at least 20 states and were essentially special money market funds that bought short-term debt and were set up to get higher yields that would otherwise have been available. Little did they know that these slightly higher yields were being produced by taking on massively higher risk through exposure to subprime toxic waste that the big brokers (Lehman in Florida's case) were more than willing to sell to them. Problems were by no means isolated to Florida either. In the last days of November, Montana school districts, cities and counties withdrew 10% of the total $2.4 billion in its investment fund after the rating on one of the pool's holdings was lowered to default. The state of Maine had invested 3% of it money, apparently on Merrill Lynch's advice, into a fund only two weeks before its credit rating was lowered to junk status. Financial difficulties with government investment pools were also reported in Orange County, California and Seattle, Washington.

While the losses of the Government Investment Pools were certainly serious, were they isolated of were they likely to spread? If these ultra-sophisticated money-market funds got into trouble, wouldn't it be reasonable to assume that the money market funds open to the individual investor might suffer similar problems in the future? By the late fall of 2007, it had already been reported that Bank of America, SunTrust, Wachovia and Legg Mason had taking steps to prop up money market funds that contained securities of possibly questionable worth. And it looked like the formerly safest of investments were in some cases becoming among the riskiest.

Next: Subprime Freezes Over

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup

For more about the New York Investing meetup, please go to our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21

Wednesday, April 2, 2008

Mortgage Insurer Meltdown


The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

Bond insurers (Ambac, MBIA, FGIC, XL Capital, ACA, Security Capital) were only one of the many sectors of the financial industry that had gotten themselves into serious trouble by the fall of 2007. While these companies were not large compared to the banks or broker-dealers, they had an out sized impact because they guaranteed most municipal bonds in the United States and the ratings of those bonds couldn't be any higher than the bond insurance companies own ratings. Lowered ratings on bonds would mean higher interest costs, higher insurance costs, and even the possibility of not being able to borrow money for municipalities throughout the country. As with most of the problems created by the credit bubble, the bill would eventually wind up at the doorstep of the American taxpayer. As bad as this was, it was by no means the full extent of the damage that would be caused if bond insurers lost their financial viability.

Bond insurers are also known as monolines because for most of their existence they only operated in one line of business, the low-risk insurance of municipal bonds. That changed however in 1998 when they persuaded New York State regulators to allow them to underwrite high-risk Credit Default Swaps (a type of derivative that is insurance on a bond) on mortgage securities. Other states promptly followed New York's lead. The bond insurers set up shell companies called 'transformers' because they transformed a traditional bond insurance contract into a Credit Default Swap. These swaps in turn allowed investment banks to move commitments off their balance sheets and book profits up front - an accounting illusion that began to implode when the housing market went into decline.

On December 19, 2007, S&P finally downgraded bond insurer ACA from A to a junk rating of CCC. S&P was apparently one of the last to realize that that the company was no longer creditworthy. The company's stock had already fallen to less than a dollar (the price the market sets when a bankruptcy is expected) and had been delisted from the New York Stock Exchange in November, but apparently even that wasn't enough for S&P to give up the fiction of its A rating on ACA. Nor did S&P explain why ACA suddenly went from a creditworthy rating to junk status overnight when it belatedly downgraded ACA in December. S&P and the other rating agencies were quite aware of what would happen if they gave the bond insurers realistic credit ratings. Shortly after their downgrade of ACA, CIBC World Markets announced that insurance for $3.5 billion in securities it held backed by subprime mortgages was possibly no longer viable. In other words, the big banks and brokerage houses would be on the hook for all the subprime garbage on (and off) their books and would have to acknowledge it if the bond insurers were downgraded. One could safely presume that there was a lot of political pressure from many quarters to prevent this from happening.

Next: Sovereign Wealth Funds Bail Out the Banks

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup

For more about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21

Tuesday, April 1, 2008

What Banks and Enron Had in Common


The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

The Subprime Crisis began to take a serious toll on bank and broker earnings by the third quarter of 2007. Merrill Lynch led the pack with a $8.4 billion dollar write down. Citibank reduced its earnings by $5.9 billion, UBS by $3.4 billion, and JP Morgan by $3.1 billion. Deutsche Banks had $3.1 billion in write downs, but still amazingly managed to post a rise in earnings (one wonders who did their accounting). There was of course a lot of chatter from the talking heads in the media about whether or not these write downs were the final word in the impact of the Subprime Crisis on financial company earnings. Even the most casual knowledge of stock market history would have provided the answer - 'no they were not!' Whenever earnings in a group of stocks start to fall apart, the first write downs are never the last and usually aren't even the biggest for that matter. This was the pattern when the tech bubble burst only a few years earlier and yet many media commentators couldn't seem to remember even that far back.
Even without a knowledge of history, there was more than enough evidence to indicate that financial company write offs might get much bigger and go on for a long time. SIVs - structured investment vehicles - had already hit the news many weeks before November of 2007. These off-balance sheet items (think Enron) were so obscure that most people on Wall Street had never heard of them. Suddenly, there were an extra $400 billion of possibly bad debt that was not on the balance sheet of the banks, but would be winding up there eventually. Citibank alone had $100 billion in credit exposure to SIVs. This new wrinkle in the Subprime Crisis was viewed as so serious by the U.S. Treasury Secretary that he attempted to organize a bailout (how he had the authority to do so is unclear) by getting a number of large banks and brokers to create a pool that could buy up SIV assets and thereby support their prices. While much ballyhooed by the press, this effort went nowhere and was eventually abandoned by December.

While the Treasury Department's plans for SIVs fell through, the Federal Reserve created an alternative that could help out the big banks. It allowed them to borrow against their (highly questionable) assets, but this necessitated bringing the assets onto the books. In December, Citibank indeed brought $49 billion in SIV assets onto it balance sheet. It is presumed that the other $51 billion the Citi had originally in SIVs had disappeared because of reductions in value. Indeed, it was reported in December that the total value of SIVs was then only $298 billion (it was quite possible that even this was a significant overstatement of their actual worth). If Citi had lost approximate $50 billion in its SIV investments, it was not fully (if at all) reflected in write offs in its first quarter 2008 earnings report.

Although SIVs were considered a serious threat to the stability of the banking system, little did the public know in the fall of 2007, that they were not the sum total of all off-balance sheet items that the banks were holding. After all, why would a company have off-balance sheet items unless it wanted to hide what it was really doing? Since there purpose is secrecy, how does anyone know how many off-balance sheet items a company has, what assets they contain, and how much those assets are really worth? While it would be reasonable to assume that if there was one type of off-balance sheet item on a companies books, there could easily be others, there was little if any speculation on this matter by the financial media. Only in February of 2008 was it reported that SIVs were actually only one type of off-balance sheet items held by the banks - and the possible losses were much greater than had been previously imagined. The accountants who did Enron's book must have been envious.

Next: Mortgage Insurer Meltdown.

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup

For more information about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21.

Monday, March 31, 2008

Subprime Housing Leads to Subprime Financial Institutions


The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

The housing reports released in October 2007 which indicated the state of the market in September were even more dismal than those of the prior month. Nationally, foreclosures had doubled year over year and they had gone up as much as 500% to a 1000% in the worst hit bubble areas of the housing market. Existing Home Sales were down 23% nationally. Although also down substantially, New Home Sales were nevertheless reported as increasing (huh?).

The September 2007 New Home Sales report was a classic example of how the financial media frequently reports bad news as good and hopes people only read the headlines and not the fine print. The New Home Sales report originally indicated that there had been 795,000 houses sold in August. The report then indicated 770,000 houses sold in September. This drop of 25,000 was heralded by the media as a increase of 4.8%. This happened because the sales figures for August were revised downward to 735,000 (by almost 8%, an incredible error for a statistical report) and the September figure was above this number, so this indicated that sales were going up! The first thought of any rational person should of course have been, 'if the numbers for August were actually much lower, why shouldn't the ones for September be much lower as well?' Even a casual look inside the September report lent substantial support that this was indeed the case. Sales in the West, probably the worst hit housing area in the U.S., were supposedly up 38% - a completely absurd number and an indication that the September numbers were being overstated just as the August numbers had been.

Despite the complete devastation in housing sales., median house prices were reported up 2.5%. The statistical tricks that led to this impossible outcome were discussed previously in this blog in the posting, "Housing Market Collapses, but the Statistics Hold Up".

House sales were falling off a cliff because mortgage money was disappearing. By October 2007, 183 mortgage lenders had already closed their doors since the previous December. One that didn't was Countrywide, the largest mortgage lender in the United States and therefore presumably too big to fail. What kept Countrywide afloat was a $2 billion capital infusion in August from Bank of America. Barron's reported that there were rumors that this bailout had been secretly arranged by the U.S. federal government. If so, it would only be the first of many bailouts that the Feds would have to arrange to prop up failing American financial institutions. Shortly thereafter, one of the major British mortgage lenders, Northern Rock, experienced a run on the bank - the first in England since the 19th century. Northern Rock had been known for it 125% mortgages and when word got out that it needed an emergency loan from the Bank of England, depositors queued up for blocks desperate to get their money out. While the Bank of England directly provided capital to keep Northern Rock going, this approach would prove to be no more successful than the more circumspect American one. Both Countrywide and Northern Rock would barely survive into 2008.

Next: What Banks and Enron Had Common

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup

For more about us, please go to: http://investing.meetup.com/21