Economic Predictions for 2008

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

The December 12, 2007 meeting of the New York Investing meetup focused on the likely economic scenarios for the coming year. A video, entitled 'Economic Predictions for 2008' summing up these predictions can be found on You Tube at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bZLsD2DHvLw.

The most important themes cited for 2008 were inflation and recession. Even though inflation is and has been under reported by the U.S. government since the 1980s, it was our opinion the even the manipulated numbers, let alone the real ones, would start to become noticeably higher. We predicted that as inflation was climbing, that the U.S. economy was likely to be gripped by recession (with negative job creation in each of the first 3 months of 2008, it now looks like the U.S. economy was in recession in the first quarter of the year). We also pointed out that it was unlikely the government would be reporting that we were in recession (the government GDP figures are unreliable, just like the inflation figures) until the recession was well under way or even over.

A widening out of the credit crisis with credit card debt, car loans and student loans being impacted was also mentioned in the talk (defaults in all of these loan types were rising significantly in the first quarter of 2008). A big drop in commercial real estate and a continuing weakness in residential real estate were also predicted (foreclosures continue to hit multi-year highs).

Special mention was made of the problems with bond insurers (monolines) and how their condition would continue to deteriorate, but the rating agencies might fail to lower their ratings appropriately because of political pressure (the official lowering of the ratings of these companies could lead to financial chaos). Bond insurer SCA's credit rating was lowered substantially in March 2008, but the rating agencies were still mostly maintaining ratings on the industry leaders MBIA and Ambac.

More bailouts of banks and broker-dealers with the assistance of the Fed was also predicted. The behind the scenes purchase of Country Wide Financial by Bank of America as the secret behest of the Federal Reserve (something denied by Bank of America) was given as an example. The Sovereign Wealth fund purchases of parts of major U.S. financial institutions, certainly with the knowledge and approval of the federal authorities, was also cited as a type of bailout that would continue to take place. Citibank in fact received just such a bailout (for the second time) in mid-January. Of course, the Bear Stearns bailout in mid-March was the most spectacular example of the of the accuracy of this prediction.

Finally it was predicted that the U.S. dollar would continue to drop and this would eventually lead to some form of currency intervention by the G7 countries (most likely late in the year, particularly after the election). Unless the Fed choices to raise rates substantially, this intervention will fail.

NEXT: The First Four Trading Days of 2008

Daryl Montgomery
Organinzer, New York Investing meetup

For more about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21.

The Fed's (long) Term Auction Facility

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

On November 28, 2007 the Federal Reserve started a massive year end injection of liquidity into the financial system. On December 11th, the Fed once again lowered the funds rate a quarter of a point (for a total of 100 basis point drop since the half point cut on September 18th). While neither of these events were extraordinary, what happened the next day was.

On December 12th, the Fed announced the creation of its Term Auction Facility . The TAF program was open to any bank or depository institution, which would be allowed to bid for one-month loans up to the total amount of funds being auctioned off. The winners had a wide-choice of what they could pledge as collateral, including mortgage-backed securities that could not be traded and had no market price. In exchange for their possibly worthless securities, banks and brokers could get cash from the Fed. This new program represented a sea change in Fed operations.

First, the Fed would be offering up sums of money in auctions to banks and depository institutions instead of having them come to the Fed to get a loan. Using the Fed's discount window was usually only done by institutions teetering on insolvency and was carefully avoided by any institution that wanted to preserve its reputation. The Fed finally found a way around this impediment to getting money to struggling banks by offering the money at auction, guaranteeing an injection of liquidity into the system at the amount auctioned off and removing the stigma for those who got the money.

The second major change the TAF introduced was that the Fed was willing to take even worthless paper as collateral for a loan. During its history the Fed usually only accepted treasuries as collateral. With the TAF, it effectively began engaging in subprime lending itself . By doing so, it was bailing out the banks that had foolishly engaged in this practice - and who might have become insolvent if they couldn't get rid of their subprime paper.

When the TAF was announced in December, the original auctions were for $20 billion each. By January 2008, this amount was raised to $30 billion. By March each auction was for $50 billion and two additional Fed lending facilities would be introduced (the TSAF and the PDCF) - breaking even newer ground for Fed operations.

Next: Economic Predictions for 2008

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup

For more about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21

Subprime Freezes Over

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

In December of 2007, the Bush administration proposed freezing the rates on adjustable subprime mortgages for 5 years. This program was 'voluntary'. Indeed the U.S. government had no legal authority to void valid contractual commercial transactions between parties, one of the most fundamental underpinnings of our economy. Nevertheless, presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and John Edwards both immediately criticized the proposal as not doing enough and advocated an even longer freeze on rates.

While the alleged purpose of this program was to help the 'struggling homeowner', an examination of the details indicated otherwise. Homeowners with fixed-rate mortgages got no relief. Homeowners with non-subprime variable-rate mortgages got no relief. Why were just sub-prime adjustable-rate mortgage holders singled out? The answer is simple, these mortgages were defaulting and would be defaulting at the highest rates. Many of these had been granted at the end of the mortgage boom and were for a substantial percentage of the house price at the time of sale (up to and even exceeding 100%). Mortgages for 100% of equity, especially when housing prices are falling, are the last thing banks want to take back and have to write off on their books. These are guaranteed losses for the bank since the foreclosed house would likely sell for much less than the amount of the mortgage. Any bank that had a large number of this type of defaulted mortgages could become technically insolvent fairly quickly. Mortgage bond holders, many of them big banks and brokers, who had bought bonds containing these loans would also lose out. It is a much better deal for banks to foreclose on mortgages that have been substantially paid down, since they make a big profit on these. These homeowners were the most deserving and required the least assistance, so they should have been the centerpiece of any mortgage relief program - but they weren't. Helping them would mean hurting bank profits.

The proposed freezing of sub-prime mortgage rates also represented the first attempt at price controls on the part of the government. Price controls are an almost universal response to inflation by the authorities and prices for necessities are the most likely to be controlled. While the rise in mortgage payments was preplanned and the exact amounts were known in advance (rarely the case with most inflation,) this was no different from any other attempts to dampen rising prices by freezing them. it was not surprising that this took place first in housing either since it is one of the most basic of necessities. Unfortunately, price controls always have negative consequences. In the case of the mortgage freeze, anyone offering loans in the future would have to demand higher rates to compensate for the possibility that rates might be frozen. Or lenders seeing higher risk in the market would simply not offer loans at all. In both these scenarios future mortgage rates will be higher than they would have been. The government could then solve this problem that it created by offering subsidies (a common second response to increased prices for necessities), most likely through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These government supported enterprises would then wind up dominating the mortgage market so much that it would effectively be completely socialized. By the end of 2007, it looked like this was already taking place.

NEXT: The Fed's (long) Term Auction Facility

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup

For more about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21

Government Investment Pools Dry Up

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

While the downgrades of the bond insurers threatened U.S. municipalities with higher future interest costs, it became obvious in November 2007 that there were far more immediate risks to public finances when there was a run on Florida's Local Government Investment Pool . The run began when word got out that the Investment Pool had exposure to $1.5 billion in defaulted and downgraded SIVs. Florida had to freeze withdrawals to prevent the fund from collapsing. The municipalities that got out early were lucky, all others had to find emergency funding to meet their payrolls for police, firemen, hospital workers, teachers, and other employees.

Local, State and Government investment pools existed in at least 20 states and were essentially special money market funds that bought short-term debt and were set up to get higher yields that would otherwise have been available. Little did they know that these slightly higher yields were being produced by taking on massively higher risk through exposure to subprime toxic waste that the big brokers (Lehman in Florida's case) were more than willing to sell to them. Problems were by no means isolated to Florida either. In the last days of November, Montana school districts, cities and counties withdrew 10% of the total $2.4 billion in its investment fund after the rating on one of the pool's holdings was lowered to default. The state of Maine had invested 3% of it money, apparently on Merrill Lynch's advice, into a fund only two weeks before its credit rating was lowered to junk status. Financial difficulties with government investment pools were also reported in Orange County, California and Seattle, Washington.

While the losses of the Government Investment Pools were certainly serious, were they isolated of were they likely to spread? If these ultra-sophisticated money-market funds got into trouble, wouldn't it be reasonable to assume that the money market funds open to the individual investor might suffer similar problems in the future? By the late fall of 2007, it had already been reported that Bank of America, SunTrust, Wachovia and Legg Mason had taking steps to prop up money market funds that contained securities of possibly questionable worth. And it looked like the formerly safest of investments were in some cases becoming among the riskiest.

Next: Subprime Freezes Over

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup

For more about the New York Investing meetup, please go to our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21

Sovereign Wealth Funds Bail Out the Banks

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

As the credit crisis unfolded in the fall of 2007, a number of big banks and brokerage houses were desperate for capital - far more desperate than was ever admitted publicly. While they needed large cash infusions to continue operating, a number of sovereign wealth funds in the oil-rich Gulf and the Far East had swollen coffers of dollars that they needed to place somewhere. It was therefore almost inevitable that some of the first bailouts (an insolvent financial institution requires multiple bailouts) of struggling financial institutions would be done by sovereign wealth fund purchases. By the end of 2007, it was estimated that these funds would make at least $37 billion of investments in Western financial companies.

The idea of foreign investment as a means of providing capital was not a completely new one. Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal of Saudi Arabia had purchased 5% of Citibank (then Citigroup) when it was reeling from the Savings and Loan Crisis in the early 1990s. Earlier in 2007, China purchased a $3 billion stake in Blackstone's IPO, which debuted just before the collapse of the private equity bubble and promptly plummeted in price. By November, Abu Dhabi had bought a 4.9% stake in Citibank for $7.5 billion. At the time of the purchase, rumors were circulating on Wall Street that Citi might be insolvent. U.S. government officials admitted being involved in the transaction, which begs the question as to whether or not they would have allowed the deal to go through if it wasn't absolutely necessary for Citibank's survival.

In early December, the Government of Singapore Investment corporation got 9% ownership in UBS for a little less than $10 billion and an unnamed middle eastern investor (thought to be Oman) bought a 2% stake. China then bought a 9.9% stake in Morgan Stanley only days before Christmas. Singapore's Temasek Holdings then helped bail out Merrill Lynch on December 24th. By mid-January, Citibank was already in need of a second bailout by the sovereign wealth funds, only two months after the first one had taken place. The Government of Singapore, the Kuwait Investment Authority and Price Alwaleed were part of a $12.5 billion capital infusion for which they got some ownership of the bank in return. On the same day, only weeks after its first cash infusion from a sovereign wealth fund, Merrill Lynch received an additional $6.6 billion from parties including the Kuwait Investment Authority and the Korean Investment Corp.

None of these deals had to undergo scrutiny by the U.S. Committee on Foreign Investment, which only examines whether acquisitions by overseas buyers compromise national security when their stakes rise above 10%. Given the large number of sovereign wealth funds and wealthy individuals in the Gulf States and Far East, it would be possible for their aggregate ownership to reach 100% without a review ever taking place.

Next: Government Investment Pools Dry Up

Daryl Montgomery

Organizer, New York Investing meetup

For more about the New York Investing meetup, please go to our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21

Mortgage Insurer Meltdown

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

Bond insurers (Ambac, MBIA, FGIC, XL Capital, ACA, Security Capital) were only one of the many sectors of the financial industry that had gotten themselves into serious trouble by the fall of 2007. While these companies were not large compared to the banks or broker-dealers, they had an out sized impact because they guaranteed most municipal bonds in the United States and the ratings of those bonds couldn't be any higher than the bond insurance companies own ratings. Lowered ratings on bonds would mean higher interest costs, higher insurance costs, and even the possibility of not being able to borrow money for municipalities throughout the country. As with most of the problems created by the credit bubble, the bill would eventually wind up at the doorstep of the American taxpayer. As bad as this was, it was by no means the full extent of the damage that would be caused if bond insurers lost their financial viability.

Bond insurers are also known as monolines because for most of their existence they only operated in one line of business, the low-risk insurance of municipal bonds. That changed however in 1998 when they persuaded New York State regulators to allow them to underwrite high-risk Credit Default Swaps (a type of derivative that is insurance on a bond) on mortgage securities. Other states promptly followed New York's lead. The bond insurers set up shell companies called 'transformers' because they transformed a traditional bond insurance contract into a Credit Default Swap. These swaps in turn allowed investment banks to move commitments off their balance sheets and book profits up front - an accounting illusion that began to implode when the housing market went into decline.

On December 19, 2007, S&P finally downgraded bond insurer ACA from A to a junk rating of CCC. S&P was apparently one of the last to realize that that the company was no longer creditworthy. The company's stock had already fallen to less than a dollar (the price the market sets when a bankruptcy is expected) and had been delisted from the New York Stock Exchange in November, but apparently even that wasn't enough for S&P to give up the fiction of its A rating on ACA. Nor did S&P explain why ACA suddenly went from a creditworthy rating to junk status overnight when it belatedly downgraded ACA in December. S&P and the other rating agencies were quite aware of what would happen if they gave the bond insurers realistic credit ratings. Shortly after their downgrade of ACA, CIBC World Markets announced that insurance for $3.5 billion in securities it held backed by subprime mortgages was possibly no longer viable. In other words, the big banks and brokerage houses would be on the hook for all the subprime garbage on (and off) their books and would have to acknowledge it if the bond insurers were downgraded. One could safely presume that there was a lot of political pressure from many quarters to prevent this from happening.

Next: Sovereign Wealth Funds Bail Out the Banks

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup

For more about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21

What Banks and Enron Had in Common

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

The Subprime Crisis began to take a serious toll on bank and broker earnings by the third quarter of 2007. Merrill Lynch led the pack with a $8.4 billion dollar write down. Citibank reduced its earnings by $5.9 billion, UBS by $3.4 billion, and JP Morgan by $3.1 billion. Deutsche Banks had $3.1 billion in write downs, but still amazingly managed to post a rise in earnings (one wonders who did their accounting). There was of course a lot of chatter from the talking heads in the media about whether or not these write downs were the final word in the impact of the Subprime Crisis on financial company earnings. Even the most casual knowledge of stock market history would have provided the answer - 'no they were not!' Whenever earnings in a group of stocks start to fall apart, the first write downs are never the last and usually aren't even the biggest for that matter. This was the pattern when the tech bubble burst only a few years earlier and yet many media commentators couldn't seem to remember even that far back.
Even without a knowledge of history, there was more than enough evidence to indicate that financial company write offs might get much bigger and go on for a long time. SIVs - structured investment vehicles - had already hit the news many weeks before November of 2007. These off-balance sheet items (think Enron) were so obscure that most people on Wall Street had never heard of them. Suddenly, there were an extra $400 billion of possibly bad debt that was not on the balance sheet of the banks, but would be winding up there eventually. Citibank alone had $100 billion in credit exposure to SIVs. This new wrinkle in the Subprime Crisis was viewed as so serious by the U.S. Treasury Secretary that he attempted to organize a bailout (how he had the authority to do so is unclear) by getting a number of large banks and brokers to create a pool that could buy up SIV assets and thereby support their prices. While much ballyhooed by the press, this effort went nowhere and was eventually abandoned by December.

While the Treasury Department's plans for SIVs fell through, the Federal Reserve created an alternative that could help out the big banks. It allowed them to borrow against their (highly questionable) assets, but this necessitated bringing the assets onto the books. In December, Citibank indeed brought $49 billion in SIV assets onto it balance sheet. It is presumed that the other $51 billion the Citi had originally in SIVs had disappeared because of reductions in value. Indeed, it was reported in December that the total value of SIVs was then only $298 billion (it was quite possible that even this was a significant overstatement of their actual worth). If Citi had lost approximate $50 billion in its SIV investments, it was not fully (if at all) reflected in write offs in its first quarter 2008 earnings report.

Although SIVs were considered a serious threat to the stability of the banking system, little did the public know in the fall of 2007, that they were not the sum total of all off-balance sheet items that the banks were holding. After all, why would a company have off-balance sheet items unless it wanted to hide what it was really doing? Since there purpose is secrecy, how does anyone know how many off-balance sheet items a company has, what assets they contain, and how much those assets are really worth? While it would be reasonable to assume that if there was one type of off-balance sheet item on a companies books, there could easily be others, there was little if any speculation on this matter by the financial media. Only in February of 2008 was it reported that SIVs were actually only one type of off-balance sheet items held by the banks - and the possible losses were much greater than had been previously imagined. The accountants who did Enron's book must have been envious.

Next: Mortgage Insurer Meltdown.

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup

For more information about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21.