Showing posts with label 1990s. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1990s. Show all posts

Monday, November 24, 2008

The Citi That Should be Put to Sleep

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

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A constant refrain that has been heard from the New York Investing meetup since the Credit Crisis began is "there is no such thing as one bailout for an insolvent financial institution". If there was a poster for credit crisis relief, Citibank's picture would be on it with words underneath, "Can you bail me out? We accept funds from Arab sheiks, sovereign wealth funds, foreign banks, the Federal Reserve, the U.S. Treasury, the FDIC, and any welfare program for banks the government can invent - and we take food stamps". As with the daily crashes in the stock market,the bailouts for Citibank have become so common it's easy to lose track of them. From the end of 2007 into the spring of 2008 there were five different bailouts five months in a row. The Fed has pumped substantial amounts into the bank through its various lending facilities. Citi got the biggest chunk of funds from the TARP bill just recently. The 'success' of these efforts came to fruition last week when Citi (C) stock went into a death spiral losing 60% of its value to close at $3.77 (it was over $55 last year).

But not to worry, the U.S. government brain trust that has come up with one ineffective failed program after another to handle the credit crisis put together a bailout package for Citi over the weekend. If they are lucky, this one will work for more than just weeks, but will stabilize things for months before the next rescue package is needed (consider this to be the optimistic scenario). Citi will get another immediate cash infusion of $20 billion from TARP funds. Treasury and the FDIC will guarantee against the "possibility of unusually large losses" on up to $306 billion of risky (a code word for worthless) loans and securities backed by residential and commercial mortgages (please note that commercial mortgages are now collapsing). Citi will assume the first $29 billion in losses on this risky pool of assets. Beyond that amount, the government would absorb 90 percent of the remaining losses, and Citi 10 percent. Money from TARP and funds from the FDIC would cover the government's portion of potential losses (this is deposit insurance money). The Federal Reserve would finance the remaining assets with a loan to Citigroup of freshly printed dollars.

So that this bailout doesn't look like the handout that it is, the U.S. government is getting $7 billion in preferred shares of Citigroup. In addition, Citi will issue warrants to the U.S. Treasury and the FDIC for approximately 254 million shares of the company's common stock (4.5% of the total) at a strike price of $10.61. It is of course possible the Citi stock could hit this level, especially if the U.S. government provides at least $10.61 of funding per share. Citigroup is also barred from paying quarterly dividends to shareholders of more than 1 cent a share for three years (it makes no sense that it should be allowed to pay any dividends, since they are being funded by the U.S. taxpayer). Citi has to additionally take steps to help distressed homeowners.

New York Investing has repeatedly said in its talks in the last year that Citi is too big to fail and the government will bail it out no matter how big a financial black hole it is. This sentiment was echoed in press coverage of the most recent bailout effort with financial commentators saying things such as"If they didn't help, the damage would be beyond imagination" and "It would create chaos [if there hadn't been a bailout]". We have also discussed how Japan followed similar policies with it banks in the 1990s and 2000s. During that time, the Japanese economy has been unable to recover and the stock market has sold off for 18 years. U.S. policy makers will have to come up with a different approach than the one used by the Japanese if they want to avoid this scenario in the U.S. So far, they haven't.

NEXT: Geithner's Appointment to Treasury, A Golden Opportunity

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

This posting is editorial opinion. Like all other postings for this blog, there is no intention to endorse the purchase or sale of any security.






Monday, August 4, 2008

The Inflation Versus Deflation Argument - Part 4

The 'Helicopter Economics Investing Guide' is meant to help educate people on how to make profitable investing choices in the current economic environment. In addition to the term helicopter economics, we have also coined the term, helicopternomics, to describe the current monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government and to update the old-fashioned term wheelbarrow economics.

While it is true that the U.S. experienced consumer price deflation in the 1930s and Japan did so in the 1990s and both experienced sharp drops in bank credit, there are few if any other similarities to the current situation in the United States in 2008. The situation in the 1930s U.S. and 1990s Japan is also a bit more nuanced that the deflationists would have you believe. In the late 1920s, the U.S. did see a big rise in money supply and credit, just as occurred in the U.S. in the early 2000s. According to the deflationists, this should have resulted in rising U.S. consumer prices at some point. It did not. Prices actually fell between 1926 and 1929. A similar thing happened in Japan in 1986. While consumer price deflation did appear in Japan after its banking system literally fell apart, it didn't show up consistently until 1999, nine years after the Japanese asset bubble began to burst. Based on these observations, the relationship between consumer prices and money supply and credit seem to be rather tenuous at best.

The deflations in the 1930s U.S. and 1990s Japan did have an important element in common that does not exist today - dropping commodity prices. As early as the spring of 1929, farm commodities in the U.S. experienced a sharp drop. All commodities declined in the crash month of October and then they crashed themselves in the spring of 1930 . While commodity prices didn't crash in the 1990s, they were weak throughout the decade. Oil reached its price low of just over $10 a barrel in 1998. Ten years later it would be almost 15 times higher. Not only were commodities not declining in the 2000s, but they were experiencing major price increases resulting in significant inflation in the U.S. and most of the world. The commodity picture in the 2000s was just the opposite of the early 1930s U.S. and 1990s Japan.

The import/export and deficit picture has no similarity to the contemporary U.S. either. In the late 1920s, the U.S. had a massive trade surplus and was the biggest creditor nation in the world. Its boom had been built on exports as was the case for Japan in the later twentieth century. Drops in exports damaged both economies. On the other hand, the U.S. in the 2000s was the biggest debtor nation in the world having both a massive trade deficit and government debt, which required heavy borrowing and had inflationary implications. Japan in the 1980s was similar to the U.S. in the 1920s and both were very dissimilar to the U.S. in the 2000s.

Currency also plays a different role in all three scenarios. The U.S. was on the gold standard until 1933 and even after that the currency didn't float. The Japanese yen traded relatively flat during the 1990s. In neither case, did currency have a significant deflationary or inflationary effect, in contrast to the U.S. in 2008 where currency played an inflationary role. The U.S. dollar dropped to all time lows in late 2007 because of the Federal Reserves easy money policy. Since the U.S. imported much more than it exported, this raised import prices and had a bigger inflationary impact than it would have had otherwise.

NEXT: The Inflation Versus the Deflation Argument - Part 5

For notes related to this talk, please see, 'Inflation vs Deflation Argument' at:
http://investing.meetup.com/21/Files

Daryl Montgomery
Organizer, New York Investing meetup
http://investing.meetup.com/21

For more about us, please see our web site: http://investing.meetup.com/21